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In this historical analysis of the Immigration and Nationality
Act Amendments of 1965, Professor Chin argues that Congress
eased restrictions on Asian immigration into the United States in
an effort to equalize immigration opportunities for groups who
had been the victims of discriminatory immigration laws in the
past. In Part I of the Article, he summarizes immigration law
before the 1965 Amendments, illustrating the restrictions on non-
white immigration which may be found in nearly all immigration
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laws before 1965.
In Part II, Professor Chin disputes the prevailing view
among scholars that Congress did not intend to ease immigration
opportunities for Asians, but passed the law with the expectation
that few Asians would immigrate as a result. Relying on
congressional documents chronicling the passage of the bill, as
well as recent interviews with participants in the 1965 legislative
process, Professor Chin rejects the argument that Congress
expected little or no change in the demographics of the
immigration stream, which was predominantly white during the
first half of the twentieth century. Professor Chin claims that this
erroneous interpretation of history is based in part on a
misunderstanding regarding Attorney General Robert Kennedy's
testimony before Congress. Professor Chin further rejects
arguments that the bill was designed almost exclusively to remedy
injustices to southern and eastern Europeans, that the easing of
restrictions on Asian immigration was passed only with the
understanding that the Act contained structural protections
against increased Asian immigration, or that legislators did not
know that Asian families and professionals wanted to immigrate
to the United States.
Instead, Professor Chin argues that the 1965 legislation is
widely misunderstood. He indicates that history shows that the
bill was passed with a racial egalitarian motivation, thus taking a
revolutionary step toward non-discriminatory immigration laws.
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"The 1965 Immigration Act... [has] been a disaster and should
be either repealed or reformed so substantially as to imitate repeal."'
From the success of California's Proposition 187,2 which denies
most public benefits to undocumented aliens, to proposals in Con-
gress to slash legal immigration, the nature of America's immigration
policy is undergoing scrutiny of a scope and intensity not seen in dec-
ades. One way of understanding what is at stake in this debate is the
continuing vitality of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amend-
ments of 1965 and the principles embodied in it. Although amended
several times since 1965, this law established a framework which en-
dures today
The revolutionary feature of the 1965 Act was its elimination of
race and national origin as selection criteria for new Americans.
Race neutrality was a significant development for American immi-
gration law, which had been explicitly race conscious from the first
1. Our Town, NAT'L REV., Aug. 23,1993, at 14,15.
2. Electoral success, at least; many provisions of Proposition 187 have been enjoined
as preempted by federal law. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F.
Supp. 755,786-87 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
3. For an overview of current immigration law, see 1 CHARLES GORDON ET AL.,
IMMIGRATioN LAW AND PROCEDURE pt. 1 (1996) (offering historical synopsis and over-
view of current law); 2 id pt. 5 (discussing details of eligibility and procedure for
obtaining permanent residence status).
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substantive federal regulation of immigrants, the Coolie Act of 1862,4
to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,' passed only thirteen
years before the 1965 Act.
The 1965 Act represents a high-water mark for opponents of
immigration restriction. They celebrate the humane spirit of the 88th
and 89th Congresses which, in two remarkable years, passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the 1965 im-
migration law. Diversification of the immigrant stream is, from this
perspective, no less a civil rights triumph than is equal opportunity
under law in the voting booth or in the workplace. The elimination
of race as a factor was a practical as well as symbolic change. Since
1965, upwards of seventy-five percent of immigrants have been from
Asia, Africa, or Central or South America.6
To some immigration restrictionists, the 1965 Act was America's
Trojan Horse, perhaps the quintessential example of the rule of unin-
tended consequences That a majority of the post-1965 immigration
has been non-white, restrictionists contend, was as unexpected as it
was undesirable. Although the 1965 Act is racially neutral on its face,
a phalanx of scholars of otherwise diverse viewpoints agree with re-
strictionists that the Act was actually designed to increase the
number of white southern and eastern European immigrants, not
people from the third world.8 Theodore H. White, for instance, wrote
that the "new [A]ct ... was noble, revolutionary-and probably the
most thoughtless of the many acts of the Great Society."9 Indeed,
4. Act of Feb. 19,1862, ch. 27,12 Stat. 340 (regulating transportation of "inhabitants
or subjects of China, known as 'coolies' "), repealed by Act of Oct. 20, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-461, 88 Stat. 1387.
5. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 202(b), 66 Stat. 163, 177
(establishing special quota attribution rule for persons tracing ancestry to races indige-
nous to "Asia-Pacific triangle" area), repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2,79 Stat. 911, 911-12.
6. See INS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE INS,
1991, at 29-30 tbl.2 (1992) (showing immigration by decade from 1971-90 and by year for
1991-92) [hereinafter 1991 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK]; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1970, at 105-09 (1976) (showing immigration by country for 1966-70)
[hereinafter BUREAU OF THE CENSUS].
7. Many commentators use the 1965 Act as a prime example of the rule of unin-
tended consequences. See, e.g., S.L. Bachman, As the Number of People Increases In Poor
Nations, the Number of People at the Borders of Rich Countries Does, Too, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 20, 1994, at 7C ("The Law of Unintended Consequences upsets
planning."); Donald Devine, Impending Debate on Immigration, WASH. TIMES, May 1,
1995, at A16 ("Talk about your unintended consequences from government actions.").
8. See infra notes 122-35 and accompanying text.
9. THEODORE H. WHITE, AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF: THE MAKING OF THE
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David Reimers questions what "[Congress] would have done if this
issue were clear in 1965,""' suggesting the possibility that the bill
would not have passed, at least not without measures designed to
minimize Asian and other non-white immigration." Roger Daniels
has no doubts: "[H]ad the Congress fully understood [the 1965 Act's}
consequences, it almost certainly would not have passed."' 2
This argument implies that the Administration and Congress
were ignorant, hypocritical, or both. The argument is not simply that
Congress was unaware of what seems obvious in retrospect: that
poor relations of Americans would want to come here, or that skilled
people from relatively impoverished regions of the world would find
life in America attractive. Neither is it the claim that officials did not
predict precisely how the details of the new law would play out. In-
stead, the argument is that the Congress which passed the 1965 Act
had a conscious belief that white immigrants would continue to
dominate the immigrant stream. Congress offered legal equality,
these people say, because and only because they firmly believed that
non-white immigrants would not take advantage of it.
Commentators such as Peter Brimelow, author of the controver-
sial Alien Nation, point to seemingly conclusive evidence of the intent
of the law, such as Attorney General Robert Kennedy's prediction
that "'5,000 [Asians] would come in the first year [under the 1965
Immigration Act], but we do not expect that there would be any great
influx after that.' ,, To some scholars, Congress's mistake may be of
historical interest only, but restrictionists contend that the law's unin-
PRE IDENT, 1956-1980, at 363 (1982). Similarly, University of North Carolina history
professor and immigration critic Otis Graham identifies the 1965 Act as a prime example
of the policies that are supposed to have killed liberalism. See Otis Graham, Jr., Tracing
Liberal Woes To '65 Immigration Act, CHImSTIAN 8ci. MONITOR, Dec. 28,1995, at 19.
10. DAVID M. REIMERS, STILL THE GOLDEN DOOR: THE THIRD WORLD COMES
To AMERICA 76 (2d ed. 1992).
11. Professor Reimers concluded: "The bill might have passed anyway, in the civil
rights and generally liberal climate of 1965, but perhaps not so easily or without other
changes." Id.
12. ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
ETHNICITY IN AMERICAN LIFE 338 (1990).
13. PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S
IMMIGRATION DISASTER 78 (1995) (quoting Sen. Robert Kennedy). A number of schol-
ars have trenchantly criticized Brimelow's policy prescriptions. See, e.g., Kevin R.
Johnson, Fear of an "Alien Nation": Race, Immigration, and Immigrants, 7 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 111 passim (1996); Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of
Constitutional Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1927 passim (1996); Peter H. Schuck,
Book Review, Alien Rumination, 105 YALE L.J. 1963 passim (1996). For a discussion of
Attorney General Robert Kennedy's statement, see infra notes 215-45 and accompanying
text.
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tended consequences make it a monumental blunder that must be
corrected.14 Lawrence Auster, an unsung godfather of the restric-
tionist movement, insists that introduction of so many immigrants of
different cultural backgrounds is leading us down "the path to na-
tional suicide." The punch line: Admit mainly whites, urge
restrictionists, or slam the door, before it's too late.15
This Article examines the conflicting viewpoints concerning the
meaning of the 1965 Act. What kind of America did the framers of
the law envision? Was it a civil rights milestone, or was it intended to
be a gesture of no impact that has gone badly wrong? A close read-
ing of the legislative history of the 1965 Act shows some support for
what is clearly the standard view that Congress did not anticipate a
change in the racial demographics of the immigration stream. Never-
theless, the more probable conclusion is that Congress intended to
create real equal opportunity for groups whose opportunity to immi-
grate had been restricted in the past. If the magnitude of the change
was unexpected, it was also probably not a major issue to a group of
legislators who, by passing laws prohibiting discrimination in a vari-
ety of contexts, demonstrated the sincerity of their faith in the
irrationality of racial distinctions.
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the racial and quasi-
racial restrictions in American immigration law which were swept
away by the 1965 Act, focusing on racial treatment of Asians. It
points out that as recently as 1952, when Congress passed the McCar-
ran-Walter Act, Congress was willing to pay a substantial price to
avoid even trivial non-white representation in the immigration
stream.
Drawing upon interviews with members of Congress and the
Administration who worked on the bill and on the legislative history
of the bill, Part II tests the scholarly consensus that Congress be-
lieved there would be no significant change in the racial
demographics of the immigrant stream. It concludes that the better
view is that Congress knew that more Asians would immigrate as a
result of the law. Because the record supports the idea that Congress
14. See, e.g., LAWRENCE AUSTER, THE PATH TO NATIONAL SUICIDE: AN ESSAY ON
IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM 10-26 (1990) (arguing that consequences of
1965 Act were unintended); id. at 82-84 (arguing for slashing legal immigration);
BRIMBLOW, supra note 13, at 74-91 (describing "accidental" nature of 1965 Act); id. at
258-59 (arguing that 1965 Act should be repealed now that its consequences are known);
Linda Seebach, Let's Vote on a U.S. Immigration Policy, BALTIMORE EVENING SUN, May
8, 1995, at 9A.
15. See AUSTER, supra note 14 passim (arguing that large-scale immigration of cul-
turally dissimilar people will destroy the American culture).
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meant exactly what it said-that race was no longer to be a factor in
America's immigration law-the conclusion of some scholars andimmigration restrictionists that Congress would not have passed the
law had it known what the effects would be is far more doubtful than
has been advanced.
I. RACE IN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW BEFORE THE 1965 AcT
A. The National Origins Quota System
Designed to maintain racial homogeneity, the national origins
quota system based the number of visas awarded annually to natives
of particular nations on the percentage of Americans who traced
their ancestry to that country. Although the workings of the quota
laws are described in detail elsewhere,16 they are briefly outlined
here. The Immigration Act of 1924,'1 the first permanent quota law,"8
provided for about 150,000 immigrant visas annually. Visas were
awarded to a country based on the number of American citizens who
traced their ancestry to that nation based on the 1920 census. Each
country received a minimum of one hundred visas per year. 9 In 1952,
the formula was amended by the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, also known as the "McCarran-Walter" Act, so that nations
were awarded quotas of one-sixth of one percent of the number of
inhabitants of the United States who traced their ancestry to that
country in 1920.' Because the proportion of eastern and southern
Europeans in the population was smaller than that of northern and
western Europeans, eastern and southern European nations received
low quotas, some receiving only the token one hundred visa mini-
mum. Americans tracing their ancestry to southern and eastern
European nations were instrumental in developing support for immi-
16. See, e.g., MARION T. BENNETT, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICIES: A
HISTORY 47-58 (1963) (describing 1924 quota system); id. at 133-52 (describing McCar-
ran-Walter quota system); E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798-1965, at 468-74 (1981); id at 187-96 (discussing 1924 quota
law); id. at 303-11 (discussing McCarran-Walter quota system); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME 83-109 (1953)
[hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N]. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN IM-
MIGRANT NATION: UNITED STATES REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION 1798-1991 (1991)
(offering an historical overview of the immigration system).
17. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190,43 Stat. 153 (amended 1952).
18. A temporary quota had been established in 1921. See Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8,
§ 2,42 Stat. 5, amended by Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190,43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952).
19. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11(b), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (amended 1952).
20. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 201(a), 66 Stat. 163, 175
(amended 1965).
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gration reform in 1965.
Americans of African descent were not counted for purposes of
awarding quotas to foreign nations.21 The law also provided special
restrictions on colonial immigration which disproportionately af-
fected persons of African descent." As a result of these factors and
others, "[b]efore 1965, Africans represented less than one percent of
the total immigrant population."'' Pre-1965 immigration policy par-
ticularly favored Canadians, Mexicans and Central and South
Americans, and other residents of the Western Hemisphere. While
England, Germany and Ireland had quotas so large that they were
often unfilled, Western Hemisphere residents were subject to no nu-
merical limitations.'
B. Controlling Asian Immigration: Exclusion and Limited Wartime
Reform
Control of the potentially massive numbers of would-be Asian
21. See id.; Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11(d), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (amended
1952) (stating that "the term 'inhabitants in continental United States in 1920' does not
include... the descendants of slave immigrants"). See generally Bill Ong Hing, Immigra-
tion Policies: Messages of Exclusion to African Americans, 37 How. LJ. 237 (1994)
(discussing African immigration to the United States).
22. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 202(c), 66 Stat. 163, 177-
78 (amended 1965). Residents of colonies were denied the unlimited immigration privi-
leges awarded to Western Hemisphere nations or full access to the quotas of their mother
countries and instead received the minimum 100-per-year quotas, which effectively lim-
ited this form of immigration. The Act provided in pertinent part:
Any immigrant born in a colony or other component or dependent area of a
governing country for which no separate or specific quota has been established
... shall be chargeable to the quota of the governing country, except that (1) not
more than one hundred persons born in any one such colony or other component
or dependent area overseas from the governing country shall be chargeable to
the quota of its governing country in any one year.
Id.
23. Hing, supra note 21, at 240.
24. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 101(a)(27)(C), 66 Stat.
163, 169 (amended 1965) (stating that the term "nonquota immigrant" includes "an immi-
grant who was born in Canada, the Republic of Mexico, the Republic of Cuba, the
Republic of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Canal Zone, or an independent country
of Central or South America"). For a discussion of Latino immigration and demograph-
ics, see Berta Esperanza Hernandez Truyol, Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos at the
Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369,
383-96 (1994). while a full discussion of Western Hemisphere immigration is beyond the
scope of this Article, it should be noted in passing that the argument of some critics that
the 1965 Act should be "blamed" for increasing Latino immigration is incorrect. See
Johnson, supra note 13, at 112 (noting that 1965 Act imposed numerical restrictions on
Western Hemisphere immigration for the first time); Motomura, supra note 13, at 1934(same).
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immigrants was a special focus of American immigration law even up
to the 1965 Act. For this reason, the law's treatment of Asian immi-
gration is something of a bellwether. American naturalization law
discriminated against non-white immigrants from the first days of the
Republic. America's first naturalization act in 1790 offered benefits
only to whites; persons of African descent were added in 1870.'
When persons of "races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere"
were added to the statute in 1940,2' only members of Asian races re-
mained ineligible to naturalize.
Asians were the only group whose immigration was restricted on
the basis of race. A consistent feature of anti-Asian immigration
laws was categorization by race and ancestry, rather than by place of
birth. For example, a person of Asian racial descent born and raised
in Brazil was treated as Asian, not Brazilian? By contrast, a Greek
family could escape discrimination under the national origins quota
system by bearing its children in more favored countries. The Chi-
nese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the first express racial restriction; as
Japanese and Asian Indians began to immigrate, they too were ex-
cluded." This process culminated in the Immigration Act of 1924,31
which tied immigration to the right to naturalization. "[A]lien[s] in-
eligible to citizenship" were excluded entirely under the 1924 law. 2
25. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch.
20, 1 Stat. 414 (retaining restriction of naturalization to "free white person[s]").
26. See Act of July 14,1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254,256.
27. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 303, 54 Stat. 1137, 1140. Mexicans in territory
ceded to the United States after the Mexican War were offered citizenship under the
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, May 30,
1848, U.S.-Mex., art. IX, 9 Stat. 922, 930, and Indians were naturalized as a group by stat-
ute in 1924. See Act of June 2,1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
28. See Hitai v. INS, 343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that a Brazilian of
Japanese ancestry could not enter as a Brazilian, but only as a Japanese).
29. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126,22 Stat. 58, repealed by Act of ]Dec. 17,1943, ch. 344,
57 Stat. 600.
30. See Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 876, repealed by Act of June 27,
1952, ch. 4, § 403(a)(13), 66 Stat. 163, 279. This legislation created the "Asiatic Barred
Zone," prohibiting immigration of natives or descendants of natives of continental Asian
countries. China was covered by the preexisting Chinese Exclusion Act, and Japanese
immigrants were covered by the "Gentlemen's Agreement," a diplomatic understanding
that Japan would not issue travel documents to laborers who wanted to come to the
United States. See BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA
THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850-1990, at 207-12 (1993) (reprinting portions of the
Gentlemen's Agreement).
31. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, repealed by Act of June 27, 1952,
ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 279. This law is also known as the Reed-Johnson Act or the National
Origins Act.
32. See Ud § 13(c), 43 Stat. at 162.
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This phrase was a euphemism for Asians because the Act defined an
alien "ineligible to citizenship" as one covered by the Chinese Exclu-
sion Act or by the Asiatic Barred Zone.3 Even though some United
States citizens traced their ancestry to Asian countries, the quota al-
lotment for Asia was zero?' After 1924, virtually no Asians couldimmigrate,35 and any who were already here were prohibited from
becoming naturalized citizens. Again, all of these laws operated on
the basis of race, not nationality.
1. Propaganda Benefits from Limited Reform
The process of eliminating racial restrictions suggests how
weighty racial concerns were. Beginning in 1943, the anti-Asian re-
strictions began to break down when Congress awarded China a
minimum quota and allowed Chinese aliens to naturalize. 6 In 1946,
Congress extended these privileges to Filipinos and Indians,' and fi-
nally, in 1952, McCarran-Walter granted these rights to all Asian
nationalities.38 At first glance, these laws appear to represent a cau-
33. See id. § 28(c), 43 Stat. at 168.
34. See id. § 11(b), (c), (d), 43 Stat. at 159 (noting that "aliens ineligible to citizen-
ship" were not counted as "inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920").
35. Asians were, however, allowed to enter if they were previously lawfully admitted
and were returning from a trip abroad, were a minister of religion or a teacher, or were
entering solely for purposes of study in an accredited school. See id. §§ 4, 13(c), 43 Stat.
at 155, 162.
36. See Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344,57 Stat. 600 (amended 1946).
37. See Act of July 2, 1946, ch. 534,60 Stat. 416 (amended 1952).
38. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 201(a), 66 Stat. 163, 175
(establishing quotas for Asia); id. § 311, 66 Stat. at 239 ("The right of a person to become
a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of race
or sex .... 2).
Practically, these changes may have been as important for Asian Americans as
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was for African Americans living un-
der Jim Crow. Extending the privilege of naturalization to Asians effectively mooted a
system of state prohibitions on various forms of civil rights, including property ownership.
See, e.g., Thomas Stuen, Asian Americans and Their Rights for Land Ownership, in ASIAN
AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 603 (Hyung-chan
Kim ed., 1992) (discussing discrimination against Asians in owning property). Mike
Masaoka, the late head of the Japanese American Citizens League, testified that he and
his four brothers served in the U.S. Army in France in World War II; when his mother
used the insurance proceeds from a son killed in combat to buy a house, the State of Cali-
fornia confiscated the property because she was an alien ineligible for citizenship. See
Immigration: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, on H.R. 7700 and 55 Identical Bills, 88th Cong. 901-02 (1964), reprinted in
10A OSCAR TRELLES & JAMES BAILEY, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACTS:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, doc. 69A (1979) [hereinafter
Hearings on H.R. 7700]. Additionally, as aliens ineligible to citizenship, Asians were pre-
cluded from receiving many professional licenses. See, e.g., In re Hong Yen Chang, 24 P.
282 [Vol. 75
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tious but real change in the attitude of the United States towards
Asian immigrants. Testifying before Congress in favor of the pro-
posals which became the 1965 Act, Secretary of State Dean Rusk
asserted that the 1943 law was a "well-considered and cautious be-ginning of a revision of our policy of excluding Asian persons [which]
has been followed by progressively liberal amendments to our
laws."39 Therefore, in Rusk's view, the 1965 reform proposal was not
a "request... that the Congress drastically depart from existing pol-
icy, but rather that it pursue to a conclusion a development which
began more than 20 years [before]."4°
The prevailing scholarly view is that Rusk put the reforms in an
unrealistically flattering light. Rather than representing a decision by
Congress about the desirability or acceptability of significant num-
bers of Asian immigrants, most authorities agree that the reforms
were essentially ad hoc responses to particular emergencies or politi-
cal circumstances. Contemporary scholars correctly observe that
World War II motivated Chinese immigration reform.41 China was
156, 157 (Cal. 1890) (holding that petitioner could not be admitted as an attorney because
he was ineligible for naturalization); In re Takuji Yamashita, 70 P. 482, 483 (Wash. 1902)
(same). See generally Philip Nash, Asian Americans and their Rights for Employment and
Education, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra, at 897 (discussing historical discrimination against Asian Americans). In
addition, allowing Asians to immigrate on the same basis as all other races allowed Asian
Americans, who constituted substantially less than 1% of the population as late as 1965,
see Immigration: Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturali-
zation of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 119 (1965) (statements by Sen.
Fong and Secretary of Labor Wirtz), reprinted in 11 TRELLES & BAILEY, supra, doe. 70
[hereinafter Hearings on S. 500], to hope that numerical (and hence political) insignifi-
canoe might not be permanent. Indeed, thanks to immigration permitted pursuant to the
1965 law, as of July 1, 1994 they represented 3.5% of the population. See U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 22 tbl. 22 (115th ed.
1995).
39. Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 388 (statement of Secretary of State
Dean Rusk). The House Judiciary Committee Report on the 1965 Act made a similar
claim in virtually the same language. H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at 13 (1965), reprinted in 11
TRELLES & BAILEY, supra note 38, doc. 71.
40. Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 388.
41. President Roosevelt himself regarded the "legislation as important in the cause of
winning the war and of establishing a secure peace." S. REP. No. 78-535, at 2 (1943).
Scholars have not missed the political aim of the law. See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 12,
at 328 (describing the repeal of Chinese Exclusion as "a good behavior prize"); ROBERT
A. DrVINE, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1924-1952, at 152-53 (1957) ("The few
who saw repeal as a renunciation of racist concepts and an effort to realize American
ideals were very definitely in a minority, and it is most improbable that the liberals could
have secured their objective on these moral and idealistic grounds."); WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 395 (1974) ("FDR felt that
nations which were largely Caucasian had to be discreet and courteous in their relations
with the colored peoples of Asia. Roosevelt took many steps in that direction, including a
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the most important allied power on the Asian continent; many other
Asian countries were under Japanese domination. It was essential to
keep China fighting to keep the Imperial Japanese Army occupied,42
yet the Allies' global war strategy, according to President Roosevelt,
"required the concentration of the greater part of our strength upon
the European front."43 Supporters insisted the bill was necessary to
request in 1943 that the Chinese Exclusion Laws be repealed."); MICHAEL C. LEMAY,
FROM OPEN DOOR TO DUTCH DOOR 99 (1987) ("Our alliance with China in the war with
Japan was the main factor leading to the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act.");
REIMERS, supra note 10, at 14-15 ("The China bill had been mainly a wartime measure,
as a gesture of friendship to an ally."); ABBA P. SCHWARTZ, THE OPEN SOCIETY 107
(1968) (stating that the repeal was "a show of good will toward an ally in war"); RONALD
TAKAKi, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE 416-17 (1989) ("World War II had
forced the United States to reopen its gates to the Chinese as well as to Filipinos and
Asian Indians. Its very claims of democracy required the country to remove the racism
contained within immigration policies."); Neil Gotanda, Towards Repeal of Asian Exclu-
sion, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND CONGRESS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 309, 316-18
(Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1995); John Hayakawa Torok, "Interest Convergence" and the Lib-
eralization of Discriminatory Immigration and Naturalization Laws Affecting Asians,
1943-65 in CHINESE AMERICA: HISTORY AND PERSPECIVES 1995, at 1, 8 (Chinese His-
torical Society of America ed., 1995); Marius A. Dimmitt, The Enactment of the
McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, at 208 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Kansas) (on file with author).
One commentator has argued:
Proclaiming its moral superiority to Hitler and fascist Europe, America was
faced with the inconsistency between its claims of equality, freedom and democ-
racy, and its own institutionalized racism, including widespread racial
segregation and the exclusion of Asians from citizenship. In short, the United
States had to 'make good its claims to democracy.'
Daina C. Chiu, Comment, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and
Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053,1068 (1994) (citation omitted).
42. A State Department official, for example, reported that the Chinese Ambassador
to the United States raised the issue with the State Department. According to the con-
versation,
[t]he Chinese Government is interested in removal of our discriminations
against the Chinese as Chinese; they are eager for recognition, technical at least,
of China and the Chinese on a basis of "equality." The fact, however, that the
Ambassador twice expressed a hope that something might be done without un-
due delay causes me to speculate as to the possibility that he had the present
military and economic situation in unoccupied China-which situation is be-
coming acute especially from point of view of morale-much in mind. What the
Ambassador said, together with other indications, causes me to believe that it is
desirable from point of view of the war effort for us to work along as liberal lines
as may be possible and as expeditiously as may be possible toward doing some-
thing constructive with regard to the solution of this question.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Advisor on Political Relations, May 29, 1943, re-
printed in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1943,
CHINA 772-73 (1957).
43. S. REP. No. 78-535, at 2. Representative Walter Judd suggested that this policy
made this bill important because it provided some tangible evidence of support when the
Allies were unable to provide munitions. The goal of winning in Europe first
could only mean to the Chinese that prolongation of their sufferings was consid-
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save American lives."
Immigration reform was particularly important because a central
part of the Japanese propaganda campaign involved reminding
Asians of the Chinese Exclusion laws.4s Representative Ed Gossett
explained:
It is a notorious fact that for many years the Japanese have
been carrying on a propaganda campaign seeking to aline
[sic] the entire oriental world behind Japanese leadership,
seeking to set the oriental world against the occidental
world. They have called it a campaign of Asia for Asiatics.
This propaganda has generally been based upon two propo-
sitions insofar as the Chinese are concerned. And mind you
just here, there is no propaganda quite so effective as true
propaganda. The first leg of Japanese propaganda was that
of extraterritoriality. The second leg has been the Chinese
exclusion laws."
ered of no consequence. The Chinese were just so many millions of flies. The
thing that was important was that the Allies get agreement in Europe. The
white man and his civilization must be saved no matter what happened to any-
one else.
89 CONG. REc. 8591 (1943) (statement of Rep. Walter Judd).
44. Representative Judd explained: "No one will dispute that this Nation is in the
most critical hour in its whole history.... The question before us, therefore, is not just
105 Chinese immigrants a year.... More important, it is thousands of American boys,
perhaps even victory or defeat in Asia." 89 CONG. REC. 8590 (1943). According to Rep-
resentative Judd:
We are sacrificing American lives insofar as we fail to mobilize fully the will
and the confidence of so indispensable an ally. I do not want on my hands the
blood of a single additional American soldier who had to die in China because
we failed here to show our purpose to treat the Chinese as equals, and thereby
weakened China's morale and will to fight offensively.
Id. at 8592. Representative Thomas Scanlon saw "this bill saving the lives of our fighting
men." Id. at 8597. Representative Judd suggested that the bill would avoid a future cata-
clysmic race war. See id. at 8633.
45. See HING, supra note 30, at 36 (noting that the 1943 law was a response to Japa-
nese propaganda); Helen Chen, Chinese Immigration into the United States: An
Analysis of Changes in Immigration Policies 111 (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Brandeis University) (on file with author) ("Congress was forced to act when Japan
mounted its propaganda campaign to discredit Americans in Asia."). For examples of
some of the Japanese propaganda, see id. at 112-14 (citing Hearings on Repeal of the Chi-
nese Exclusion Acts, H.R. 1882 & H.R. 2309, Before the House Comm. on Immigration
and Naturalization, 78th Cong. 4041 (1943)).
46. 89 CONG. REC. 8581 (1943) (remarks of Rep. Ed Gossett). "Extraterritoriality"
was the doctrine invoked by colonial powers to deprive foreign nations of jurisdiction
over crimes by Westerners, who would be tried by courts constituted by their home coun-
tries. The United States Court for China was an example of this practice. For a
discussion of the legal and historical background of the Court for China, see Mookini v.
United States, 303 U.S. 201 (1938), and David J. Bederman, Extraterritorial Domicile and
the Constitution, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 451,460-74 (1988).
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Similarly, Representative Thomas Scanlon explained that the prob-
lem with this particular propaganda was that it was "based on
truth."
47
The Chinese Repealer was an effort to fight propaganda with
propaganda rather than with significant levels of actual immigration.8
Using techniques replicated in later statutes, the law's structure en-
sured that Chinese would have only a limited presence. First, the
quota assigned was insignificant-105 annually. Second, this quota
did not apply simply to citizens of China, or persons in China, but
persons of Chinese racial origin, regardless of their citizenship, na-
tionality, or place of birth. This broad application addressed
Congress's concern that persons of Chinese ancestry born in coun-
tries with larger quotas could enter through the quota of that country,
thereby exceeding the 105 annual limitation.4' Notions of racial
equality seem not to have been an important motivating force."
47. 89 CONG. REc. 8596 (1943). A memorandum by a State Department official
confirmed this problem:
During the past forty years the Japanese, increasingly smarting under the griev-
ance, as they saw it, of our discrimination against them as a race, made of this
discrimination a diplomatic issue and used the fact of this discrimination as a
springboard and a projectile of propaganda among their own people against the
white race in general and the United States in particular.
Memorandum by the Advisor on Political Relations, June 9, 1943, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, supra note 42, at 777.
48. Representative Earl Michener correctly pointed out that "the enactment of this
legislation will have an infinitesimal effect on immigration into this country." 89 CONG.
REC. 8603 (1943); see also id. at 8628 (remarks of Rep. William Poage) ("[I]t will have no
practical effect on the United States .... In China, however, it will have vast practical
effects."). The Senate Report noted that "[t]he number of Chinese who will actually be
made eligible for naturalization under this section is negligible." S. REP. No. 78-535, at 6.
Representative John Coffee, likewise, assured doubters that the "current proposal is a
gesture-a beau geste. This does not open the door. Some people think it is the camel
putting its nose under the tent. But this assures the people of China that we recognize
them as equals." 89 CONG. REC. 8601 (1943). President Roosevelt himself observed that
"[t]here can be no reasonable apprehension that any such number of immigrants will
cause unemployment or provide competition in the search for jobs." S. REP. NO. 78-535,
at 3. Attorney General Biddle, likewise, wrote that "no useful purpose is being served by
keeping the Chinese exclusion laws in effect, since under the quota provisions the Chinese
quota would be only 105 persons annually." Id. at 2; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra
note 42, at 778 (observation of a State Department official that "[t]he immediate problem
so far as this country is concerned is that of so revising our laws and procedures as to
eliminate discrimination against the Chinese and at the same time safeguard ourselves
against a large influx of Chinese immigrants").
49. See, e.g., 89 CONG. REC. 8582 (1943) (remarks of Rep. Fred Busbey). Represen-
tative Judd assured his colleagues that "[tihere are no loopholes whereby persons of the
Chinese race who were born in Hong Kong, for example, and therefore are British citi-
zens, could come in under the British quota." Id. at 8588.
50. While there was an occasional reference to racial equality, see, e.g., id. at 8593
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In 1952, the McCarran-Walter Act eliminated the remaining bars
against Asian naturalization and awarded all Asian countries immi-
gration quotas, most of which were the hundred-per-year minimum."
Although the statute has been credited with representing some prog-
ress towards racial equality, 2 as with the Chinese Repealer, many
scholars have correctly observed that congressional proponents of the
bill relied almost exclusively on the foreign policy benefit of reducing
racial restrictions against Asians.' As the House Judiciary Commit-
tee Report explained:
This bill would make all persons, regardless of race, eligible
for naturalization, and would set up minimum quotas for
aliens now barred for racial reasons. Thus, persons of Japa-
nese, Korean, Indonesian, etc., ancestry could be admitted
and naturalized as any other qualified alien. No doubt this
will have a favorable effect on our international relations,
particularly in the Far East. American exclusion policy has
long been resented there and, in the eyes of qualified ob-
servers, was an important factor in the anti-American
(remarks of Rep. Judd), the circumstances, in addition to the avowed military purposes of
the bill, belie any such purpose. Indeed, during the hearings on the bill, when a witness
admitted that he supported "social equality among all the races," Representative Leo
Allen replied: "I thank you for giving your views. You have done your cause more harm
than anybody else." Hearings on Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, H.R. 1882 & H.R.
2309, Before the House Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 78th Cong. 40-41
(1943).
51. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 201(a), 66 Stat. 163, 175
("[T]he minimum quota for any quota area shall be one hundred.").
52. See, e.g., ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1850, at 284 (1988) ("Even more important than the changes in
law were the changes in American ideology.... [S]ometime between June 1941, when
Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 establishing a Fair Employment Prac-
tices Commission, and June 1952, when Congress dropped the racial and ethnic bars to
naturalization, some kind of Rubicon in American policy had been crossed."); MICHAEL
C. LEMAY, ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC POLICY: THE REFORM OF CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW 10 (1994) ("Although the McCarran-Walter Act was
restrictionist in its reaffirmation of the quota system, in order to secure its passage two
provisions were included that did involve opening new doors. The Act established very
token quotas for those nations-previously excluded-that were defined as the 'Asian-
Pacific [sic] Triangle.' It opened up, for the first time since the late 1880s and the 1920s,
the possibility of some Asian influx."); REED UEDA, POSTWAR IMMIGRANT AMERICA 43
(1994) ("Despite its basic conservatism, the McCarran-Walter Act did loosen some cor-
nerstones of restrictionist policy.... [T"he 1952 law demolished the long-standing
principle of Asian exclusion.").
53. See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 12, at 329 (stating that the 1952 liberalization
"should be seen as a fruit of the Cold War"); DIVINE, supra note 41, at 173-74; HING,
supra note 30, at 37-38 ("The ideological Cold War between capitalism and communism
made the United States acutely conscious of how its domestic policies, including immigra-
tion, were perceived abroad."); Torok, supra note 41, at 10-11, Chen, supra note 45, at
124; Dimmitt, supra note 41, at 209.
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feeling in Japan prior to the last World War?
Dean Acheson also recognized the political implications, writing to
President Truman that "[o]ur failure to remove racial barriers pro-
vides the Kremlin with unlimited political and propaganda capital for
use against us in Japan and the entire Far East."' Extending immi-
gration and naturalization privileges to natives of all Asian nations
surely blunted this propaganda.
2. Propaganda Problems from Limited Reform
If war pressure explains why the laws were liberalized in the
ways they were, it fails to explain why the reforms did not go far
enough to satisfy the strategic concerns which generated them. With
regard to the 1943 law, for example, one commentator persuasively
explained that "[t]he ban was lifted because the Chinese were now
our allies, and it would be unseemly to deny admission to the nation-
als of a country with whom we were fighting to rid the world of fascist
and racist philosophies."5 However, if it was unseemly to exclude
Chinese, was it not equally unseemly to exclude Indians and citizens
of other countries or colonies whose people were fighting on behalf
of the Allies?
Scholars have not particularly focused on the double-edged na-
ture of the propaganda effect of the Chinese Repealer and this
feature of McCarran-Walter.17 Members of Congress, however, un-
54. H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 28-29 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653,
1679.
55. Memorandum by Secretary of State to the President, Apr. 14, 1952, reprinted in I
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954,
GENERAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MATTERS 1587 (1983).
56. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, ARE AMERICANS EXTINCr? 103 (1968).
57. Some commentators obliquely mention the inconsistency. See, e.g., JOHN W.
DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR 166 (1986)(noting that "any attempt to redress the insult to China would draw further attention to
the larger anti-Oriental context of U.S. immigration policy"). Divine observed that the
discriminatory features of the McCarran-Walter Act could have bad side effects in Asia,
DIVINE, supra note 41, at 173-74, and called the McCarran-Walter Act a "triumph of
nationalism over international considerations." Id. at 190. Divine explained: "Extremely
conscious of a crisis in world affairs, the restrictionists viewed the McCarran bill as a vital
measure designed to protect the integrity of the nation." Id. at 178. Nevertheless, some
understand the McCarran-Walter Act's limited reform of Asian immigration to be a
counterexample of Divine's point. See UEDA, supra note 52, at 43. Reimers appears to
be unsure how this aspect of McCarran-Walter helped American security, but he does not
go so far as to contend that it had a negative impact. See REIMERS, supra note 10, at 62("While the security provisions of the measure clearly related to the Communist issue, it
was not clear that national origins and the racially discriminatory provisions of the Asia-
Pacific triangle enhanced American security. But immigration laws were not always logi-
cal.").
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derstood at the time that retaining discriminatory treatment for
Asians would blunt the propaganda benefits of reform.
In 1943, for example, in addition to those who made traditional
race-based anti-Chinese arguments,-" a group of dissenters in the
House Immigration and Naturalization Committee 9 and other oppo-
nents claimed that the bill created new propaganda problems with
other Asian countries while addressing the Chinese morale problem
poorly. Representative John Bennett of Michigan, a member of the
Immigration and Naturalization Committee and an opponent of the
bill, argued that the bill was a transparent gesture because it retained
racial treatment for Chinese:
[T]his bill does not give the Chinese equality on immigra-
tion with any European nation.... [Y]ou compel the
Chinese to come here by race and permit Europeans to
come on the basis of nativity. This result did not come
about by accident. It was brought about by a studied and in-
tentional limitation in this particular bill which says in the
one breath to China, we are treating you on the basis of
equality with Europeans, but in the next breath, it positively
limits the number of Chinese by restricting their entry to
race regardless of the country of their birth.... Do you
think for [one] minute that they are so abstruse that they
will not discern the emptiness of this gesture[?] ... Let us
not proceed on the assumption that we are fooling anyone
about this legislation.'
As Representative Bertrand Gearhart suggested, the tiny quota also
made the benefit inconsequential as a practical matter.6
Bennett also argued that the bill was not an effective counter to
Japanese propaganda because it left all other Asians subject to the
exclusion.
While this fails to cure the propaganda situation as it pres-
ently exists it creates an additional propaganda weapon with
58. One group relied on traditional antipathy to the Chinese, see 89 CONG. REc. 9989
(1943) (remarks of Sen. Rufus Holman), contending that the bill was an "attempt to put
the camel's nose under the tent of our immigration laws." Id. at 8602 (remarks of Rep.
John Jennings); accord id. at 8626 (remarks of Rep. Compton White). One member sug-
gested that allowing Chinese in would give "Japan an argument for breaking down our
immigration laws, so that she can flood ... Washington, Oregon, and California with
Japanese immigrants." Id. at 8631 (remarks of Rep. John Rankin).
59. See H.R. REP. No. 78-732, pt. 2, at 1-2 (1943).
60. 89 CONG. REC. 8584 (1943) (remarks of Rep. Bennett). Representative Thomas
Jenkins, likewise, stated that "I do not rate the Chinese as being so ignorant and so easy
as not to notice how they are being fooled and discriminated against." Id. at 8599.
61. See id. at 8589.
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respect to the Asiatics, particularly the Filipinos. By the
provisions of this measure we put China in a favored posi-
tion as against all other Asiatics, including the Filipinos who
have been and are at present our own nationals.... Do you
see then what further difficulties this legislation creates for
us? As far as I can observe, if we are to place China on a
quota basis there is no valid reason for refusing to do like-
wise for other Asiatics and, particularly, the Filipinos.62
Representative William Elmer agreed that "[t]o elevate China now
above the other Asiatics is a discrimination against them and lays the
foundation for future disputes with them."'
The fascinating point about these arguments is that they were
advanced by legislators who opposed liberalization entirely. Recog-
nizing that it would appear hypocritical to provide a benefit to China
but not to other Allied Asian nations such as India, they opposed re-
form even for the Chinese, rather than extending privileges to other
Asian nationalities. All recognized that exclusion from immigration
was a fact which was used as propaganda by the Japanese across
Asia; indeed, the State Department reported that "this question is of
importance from the point of view of the current and the future in-
fluence of the United States in our relations not only with China, but
with the other countries of Asia and the world in general."'"
Instead of extending the token benefit of minimum quotas under
the 1924 Immigration Act to other Asian nations and thus defusing
this propaganda at relatively low cost, opponents thought it was bet-
ter to continue denying immigration privileges to Chinese.
Supporters, too, chose not to try to extend the bill to non-Chinese
Asians; this was a special Chinese law for a special Chinese situation.
Representative Warren Magnuson explained that "other Asiatic na-
tions are not in the same position as China";6 that is, they were less
strategically important. Congress chose to forego a potential propa-
ganda benefit because it was unwilling to pay the price of, say, five
hundred visas annually, a number that in a millennium of immigra-
62. Id. at 8584. Representative Jenkins shared this view. See id. at 8598.
63. Id. at 8593. Senator Hiram Johnson argued:
China is not our only Ally subject to our exclusion laws. What about our brave
Allies the Filipinos, and what about all the potential Allies in the Orient, the na-
tives of India, Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and others? Is not this
proposed legislation a deliberate slap in the face for all Asiatic peoples, except
only the Chinese?
Id. at 9999 (statement of Sen. Hiram Johnson).
64. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 42, at 779.
65. 89 CONG. REC. 8587 (1943).
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tion would have added less than one percent to the population of the
United States.6
Again, few academic commentators have focused on the fact
that the special, humiliating restrictions on Asian immigration un-
dermined the avowed foreign policy purposes of the McCarran-
Walter Act or suggest that reference to the Cold War in and of itself
is insufficient to explain the structure of the law. 7 Just as in 1943, for
example, the 1952 law provided strict controls on the admission of
Asians. While the near-absolute prohibition on Asian immigration
was eliminated, Congress replaced it with the Asia Pacific triangle, a
geographic area subject to special restrictions. Congress awarded
each triangle country a minimum quota of one hundred,' but the to-
tal immigration from the triangle was limited to two thousand.69
Thus, if more than twenty countries came into being within the trian-
gle, all triangle countries would have their quotas reduced.
In addition, following the Chinese Repealer model, the McCar-
ran-Walter Act retained a racial test solely for persons tracing more
than half of their ancestry to countries in the Asia Pacific triangle.
Such persons were charged against the quota of their racial home-
land, rather than their country of birth. As one commentator
acknowledged, the triangle provision was "an obvious device to pre-
vent such persons, because of their race, from immigrating to the
United States under the possibly large quotas of their country of
birth, or in the case of Western Hemisphere countries, from coming
66. That is, 500 visas times 1000 years is 500,000; less than one-half of one percent of
the American population which, in 1940, was more than 131 million. See U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, supra note 38, at 8 tbl.1.
67. But see sources cited supra note 57 (addressing the inconsistencies caused by re-
strictions on Asian immigration under the Act).
68. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 201(a), 66 Stat. 163, 175.
China and Japan received marginally larger quotas. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra
note 16, at 99-101 tbl.5 (noting that China received a quota of 105 and Japan a quota of
185).
69. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 202(e), 66 Stat. at 178
(stating that "any increase in the number of minimum quota areas above twenty within
the Asia-Pacific triangle shall result in a proportionate decrease in each minimum quota
of such area in order that the sum total of all minimum quotas within the Asia-Pacific
triangle shall not exceed two thousand"). This feature of the law was removed in 1961.
See Act Amending the Immigration and Nationality Act and For Other Purposes, Pub. L.
No. 87-301, § 9,75 Stat. 650,654 (1961); H.R. REP. No. 87-1086, at 45 (1961), reprinted in
1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2979. Thus, after 1961, new countries in the triangle could be
recognized without diminishing the quotas of preexisting nations.
70. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 202(b), 66 Stat. at 177, repealed
by Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79
Stat. 911, 911-12.
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into the United States on a non-quota basis."71
Asian peoples could not have missed the import of these provi-
sions, which presumably gave them little reason to align with the
United States rather than the Soviet bloc. The self-defeating effect of
the law appears not only in hindsight, but was emphasized by con-
gressional critics who favored greater liberalization. However, the
reasoning of this group was not that the bill was insufficiently egali-
tarian, but that its remaining discriminations against Asians were
unwise in light of the Korean War and the global struggle with Com-
munism.7 The minority Senate Judiciary Committee Report
explained that Asian nations would be insulted by these restrictions:
For the United States to apply the country-of-birth for-
mula uniformly except for persons of Asiatic-Pacific descent
would mean discrimination, on our part, between the native
citizens of any given country, on grounds of ancestry. This
proposed test will certainly be offensive to Indonesia,
Burma, Siam, Japan, and other countries whose interna-
tional cooperation we are seeking and to whom we will be
attributing a contaminating ancestry.... Finally, these pro-
visions are insulting to hundreds of thousands of citizens
and residents of the United States.
Complete adoption of the principle that an alien be
chargeable to the quota of his country of birth, regardless of
race, on the other hand, would enhance our Nation's moral
leadership in the world and, in particular, would strengthen
our prestige in the critical areas of Asia and the lands of the
Pacific where the struggle between democracy and commu-
nism rages most fiercely in the minds of men. The gain to us
may be the lives of millions of our sons.'
In a separate statement to the House Judiciary Committee Re-
port, Representative Emanuel Celler also suggested that the
restrictions were unwise: "The effect in Asia of such discrimination
71. SCHWARTZ, supra note 41, at 109.
72. This point was noted by the Administration as well. See Memorandum by the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget to the President, May 9, 1952 (noting that Walter
bill contained a racial attribution feature, which because it "would apply only in Asia and
nowhere else in the world, would call into question the meaning and sincerity of the ges-
tures made by the bill .... The Kremlin is always quick to seize upon any half measure as
proof of democratic duplicity."), reprinted in I U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 55, at
1591; see also Iid. at 1595 ("These restrictions would announce to the peoples of Asia 'the
United States still considers you undesirable. We're going to have one set of rules for
everyone else in the world and a special set of rules for you. We want to make sure that
too many of you won't come over.' ").
73. S. REP. No. 82-1137, pt. 2, at 5 (1952).
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will have far-reaching effect and will supply ammunition for Com-
munist propaganda in that troubled area of the world.... Tragic
consequences are foreseeable, as a result of such legislation, in the
development of our foreign policy vis-A-vis Asia."'74
These themes were repeated in the House floor debates. Liber-
alization was favored as a means of improving "our relations with the
people of the Far East,"' but the special treatment of Asians, it was
argued, was antagonistic to this goal.' In the Senate, as well, there
was vigorous debate about whether the bill went far enough to satisfy
foreign policy needs. Hubert Humphrey, a leading critic of the dis-
criminatory aspects of the bill, observed:
[T]he future of the world may well depend on what happens
in Asia, Africa, the Near East, and in the underdeveloped
and underprivileged areas of the world.
I submit that the passage of the pending bill would an-
nounce by public policy and by public act of the Congress of
the United States that we do not consider them to be free
and equal citizens; that we consider them to be unwanted,
unequal, and undesirable.
That would bring about the worst kind of international
relations .....
Later that day, he stated that "[t]he philosophy which is embodied in
this legislation may have a profound effect upon American policies
and American relationships in areas of the world where today we
stand very, very weak."' 8 Senators Herbert Lehman,' 9 John Pastore8
and Brien McMahon!' made similar arguments. The reality of the
74. H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 327-28 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752
(additional views of Mr. Celler).
75. 98 CONG. REC. 4304 (1952) (remarks of Rep. Farrington).
76. See id. at 4311 (remarks of Rep. Louis Heller).
77. Id. at 5315.
7& Id. at 5432.
79. Senator Lehman argued:
We cannot fool the world. Let us not fool ourselves. If we wish to show our
good faith to all of Asia, if we wish to rob the Communists of one of their
strongest propaganda weapons in the Far East and wherever in the world there
are people with colored skins, if we wish to discard outmoded racist doctrines, if
we are not scared of bogeys dreamed up by our opponents, then let us wipe out
discriminations in our immigration law based on race.
Id. at 5612.
80. See id. at 5162.
81. Senator McMahon insisted that "[n]o propaganda, no assertion of pious inten-
tions and principles, can drown out the plain speaking of our own action here. The free
1996]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
negative foreign policy implications was emphasized by Senator
Lehman, who noted that even before the bill became law, the Philip-
pines was planning a protest to the United States government.'
In 1952, as in 1943, members of Congress invoked the Asian war
as a justification for liberalization. Senator William Benton sug-
gested that the bill was "potentially more costly, more damaging to
the national interest, than any major bill which has come to the floor
with so little understanding about it on the part of the Senate as a
whole." ' 3 Benton explained:
What folly it is for us, Mr. President, to spend hundreds of
billions of dollars on defense and to incur more than 100,000
casualties in Korea, and then to undercut this great invest-
ment of our boys' blood and their parents' money by passing
a bill which turns the world against us ....
[W]e can totally destroy that investment, and can ruth-
lessly and stupidly destroy faith and respect in our great
principles, by enacting laws that, in effect, say to the peoples
of the world:
"We love you, but we love you from afar. We want you
but, for God's sake, stay where you are.' m
Benton went so far as to argue that the earlier Asian Exclusion laws
contributed directly to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor."
world which we seek to unite against the threat of encroaching totalitarianism will not be
deceived." Id. at 5216-17.
82. See id. at 5332.
83. 98 CONG. REC. 5149 (1952). Benton was in an excellent position to evaluate the
effects of propaganda on foreign policy; he had been both an assistant secretary of state
involved in the founding of the United Nations, and the founder of a major Madison Ave-
nue advertising agency, Benton & Bowles. For a discussion of his activities, see generally
SIDNEY HYMAN, THE LIVES OF WILLIAM BENTON (1969).
84. 98 CONG. REc. 5150 (1952).
85. Senator Benton reported that he:
happened to be in Japan in 1937 on the anniversary of the day when the United
States enacted its Oriental Exclusion Act. [sic] To my astonishment, I saw black
flags break out all over Tokyo, even draped on buildings. It was a national day
of mourning in Japan, a day of humiliation. No man knows the extent to which
the Oriental Exclusion Act, by which we insulted the proud peoples of Asia, was
responsible for the temper of the Japanese people which lead to the attack upon
the United States at Pearl Harbor.
Id. at 5157; see also id. at 5616 (making similar comment).
A 1943 memorandum by a State Department official offers some support for this
view:
The burning hostility of such men as the late Admiral Yamamoto toward the
United States, and the desire and intention and plans and efforts of such men to
make war upon and defeat the United States were animated in no small part by
their view of and emotions regarding this matter of discrimination on our part
against the race of which they were and are members.
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War concerns were not enough to move restrictionists. Senator
McCarran opposed a substitute bill proposed by Senators Humphrey
and Lehman which would have retained the essentials of the national
origins system, but would have treated Asians the same as members
of other races. McCarran's response was that any foreign policy
benefits would be outweighed by the cultural harms of increased
Asian immigration:
[T]he cold, hard truth is that in the United States today
there are hard-core, indigestible blocs who have not became
[sic] integrated into the American way of life, but who, on
the contrary, are its deadly enemy. The cold, hard truth,
Mr. President, is that today, as never before, untold millions
are storming our gates for admission; and those gates are
cracking under the strain. The cold, hard fact is, too, Mr.
President, that this Nation is the last hope of western civili-
zation; and if this oasis of the world shall be overrun,
perverted, contaminated, or destroyed, then the last flick-
ering light of humanity will be extinguished. A solution of
the problems of Europe and Asia, Mr. President, will not
come as we transplant these problems en masse to the
United States of America."
McCarran 'further explained that the results of the Humphrey-
Lehman bill would be so drastic that Asian American groups them-
selves opposed them. He argued that the "provisions of the
substitute bill are so fantastic, so drastic, and so unrealistic that the
major oriental groups in the United States are unalterably opposed to
the amendment, because they know it would give -them the kiss of
death," apparently implying that any effort at broader liberalization
would be fatal to the bill. Senator McCarran pointed out that many
Asian-American organizations supported his bill rather than the
more liberal substitute.'
Memorandum by the Advisor on Political Relations, June 9, 1943, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, supra note 42, at 777.
86. 98 CONG. REC. 5330 (1952).
87. Id. at 5624; see also id. at 5329 (referring to "kiss of death").
88. See id. at 5092. Perhaps these Asian American groups supported Senator McCar-
ran's bill because they thought it was the best they could get. Cf. HING, supra note 30, at
55 (noting that the Japanese American Citizens League supported the McCarran-Walter
bill, because it would allow the first-generation Japanese immigrants ("Issei") to natural-
ize). Some Asian American groups withdrew their support for McCarran-Walter once
the more liberal Humphrey-Lehman substitute was introduced. See 98 CONG. REC. at
5791,5795.
Senator Francis Case attempted to respond to the foreign policy argument, first con-
tending that the claim was unworthy of an American: "Mr. President, if that argument
were true, it should not be advanced by an American." Id. at 5764. He also noted that
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The Humphrey-Lehman substitute was defeated, and the
McCarran-Walter bill was passed by both houses. However, Presi-
dent Truman vetoed it, urging the Congress "to enact legislation
removing racial barriers against Asians from our laws. Failure to
take this step profits us nothing and can only have serious conse-
quences for our relations with the peoples of the Far East.2
89
Congress overrode the veto.
Immediately after the bill was passed, Radio Moscow broad-
casted the news to the Korean battlefront,' suggesting that
propaganda concerns were not groundless. 9 Thirteen years later,
many witnesses testifying about the 1965 immigration bill contended
that McCarran-Walter created significant foreign policy difficulties,'
notably Secretary of State Dean Rusk and James Sheldon, a Viet-
nam War "hawk" from the United Church of Christ who reported
that McCarran-Walter "provided [Communists in Vietnam] a
weapon worth more than a whole fleet of helicopters."94
the Soviet Union also did not have a very good immigration policy:
Russia has no policy for inviting the immigration of peoples from other parts of
the world. If she maintains an iron border against outside nationalities ... it is
ridiculous to say that because we have a policy of maintaining the historic pro-
portions in this country, we are playing into the hands of the Kremlin.
Id This overlooked the central message of American Cold War policy that the Soviet
Union was an inappropriate role model.
89. H.R. DOC. No. 520, reprinted in 98 CONG. REC. 8082,8085 (1952).
90. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 16, at 52-53 (discussing Radio Moscow's
broadcast to Korea).
91. Another commentator reported in 1956 that the Soviets were exploiting discrimi-
natory provisions of McCarran-Walter as part of their "New Look" policy. See J. Donald
Kingsley, Immigration and Our Foreign Policy Objectives, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
299, 306 (1956).
92. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 623 (remarks of Mike Masaoka of
the Japanese American Citizens League); id at 144 (remarks of Sen. Hugh Scott, report-
ing complaints about McCarran-Walter from officials in Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia,
Singapore, New Zealand, Fiji, Tahiti and elsewhere); Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note
38, at 390 (remarks of Secretary of State Dean Rusk); id at 257 (remarks of Rep. Spark
Matsunaga). Representative Matsunaga stated:
We are expending more than a million dollars a day together with the valuable
lives of Americans in Vietnam. We are still facing the Communist Chinese
across the truce lines in Korea. We stand prepared to aid India to resist further
Communist Chinese aggression along its Himalayan frontiers. However, mili-
tary victory over communism is only a phase; it must be accompanied by victory
in the battle for men's minds.
Id.
93. See Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 51 (statement of Secretary of State Dean
Rusk); Immigration: Hearings on H.R 2580 Before Subcomm. No. I of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 91-95 (1965) (same), reprinted in 10 TRELLES & BAILEY,
supra note 38, doe. 69 [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2580].
94. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 878 (testimony of James Sheldon, represen-
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In retrospect, the risk of increased Asian immigration seems
fairly low. If immigration privileges had been extended to all Allied
Asians in 1943, an absolute cap could have been imposed as it was in
1952. If McCarran-Walter had applied the place-of-birth principle to
Asians as it did to members of all other races, it may well be that few
additional Asians would have entered. A contemporary critic in-
sisted that "[t]he numbers involved in a nondiscriminatory approach
would be so small as to be insignificant.""
In 1943 and 1952, then, measures which could have offered aid in
what were alleged to be struggles for national survival failed in the
face of the historic policy of racial regulation of the immigrant
stream. Congressional willingness to pay that price at those times for
racial purity suggests a deep attachment to the idea.
H. REAL REFORM: THE 1965 IMMIGRATION AcT
"I think Christ would be excluded under present law."
96
The year 1965 brought an abrupt change to American immigra-
tion law. The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of
1965,9 sometimes known as "Hart-Celler," was structurally familiar
tative of the United Church of Christ); see also Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra note 93, at
369 (offering similar opinion).
95. Kingsley, supra note 91, at 306. This claim is supported by projections made in
hearings on the bill which became the 1965 Act. Secretary of State Dean Rusk antici-
pated that approximately 5,000 Western Hemisphere residents of Asian racial ancestry,
then ineligible to immigrate because the Asia-Pacific triangle quotas were filled, would
come to the United States; Assistant Attorney General Norbert Schlei predicted that the
same number of Asians would come the first year they were eligible to enter from the
non-quota areas of the Western Hemisphere and from areas with undersubscribed quotas
such as England, but he contended that the number would decrease thereafter. See infra
notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
96. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 342 (remarks of Anthony Celebrezze, Secre-
tary of Health, Education and Welfare).
97. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
On July 23, 1963, President Kennedy sent his immigration reform proposal to Con-
gress, where it was introduced as H.R. 7700 in the House and S. 1932 in the Senate.
Congress held hearings on both bills. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 16, at 359-60. On
January 13, 1965, President Johnson sent a similar immigration proposal to Congress
which was introduced as H.R. 2580 in the House and S. 500 in the Senate. Hearings be-
gan in February of 1965 in the Senate and in March of 1965 in the House. See id. at 367-
68. Less than one year passed between the last hearings on the Kennedy proposal and the
first hearings on the Johnson proposal, and, as Senator Edward Kennedy explained, John-
son's "recommendations ... with very minor exceptions, paralleled those of President
Kennedy." Edwrd M. Kennedy, The Immigration Act of 1965,367 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. ScI. 137, 142 (1966). Similarly, James J. Hines of the Office of the Legal
Adviser, U.S. Department of State, did a section-by-section comparison of the Admini-
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in certain ways. 8 The new law provided for restricted immigration; a
limit of 170,000 visas per year was imposed on the citizens of the
countries in the Eastern Hemisphere." Furthermore, no more than
20,000 visas per year could go to natives of any one nation."m McCar-
ran-Walter's system of awarding visas according to preference
categories based on skills or family relationships was repeated in the
new law; the new preference categories were based on employment
skills or family connections to citizens or permanent resident aliens."'1
In addition, immediate relatives of citizens-spouses, parents and
unmarried children-could enter without numerical limitation, that
is, regardless of whether one of the 170,000 Eastern Hemisphere (or
20,000 per country) visas were available, and without being charged
against those limits.1"
Western Hemisphere immigration was limited for the first time
to 120,000, but without preferences or per-country limitations. 3 As
in the Eastern Hemisphere, immediate relatives of citizens could en-
ter without regard to the 120,000 annual limitation.'14  The law's
revolutionary feature was its race-neutrality: For the first time since
the United States started regulating immigration, race was not a fac-
tor.
A. Foreign Policy and War Policy
As in 1943 and 1952, foreign policy concerns surely helped pass
the 1965 Act.05 Representative Michael Feighan, Chairman of the
stration proposal and the bill which became law and found them substantially similar. See
James 3. Hines, The Immigration Act of 1965, 43 INTERPRETER RELEASES 59, 59-61
(1966). Accordingly, the hearings on H.R. 7700 and S. 1932 are treated as relevant to the
meaning of the final law.
98. For additional discussions of the Act's workings, see H.R. REP. No. 89-745, at 8-
23 (1965); S. REP. No. 89-748, at 10-26 (1965), reprinted in 11 TRELLES & BAILEY, supra
note 38, doc. 73, and in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328,3328-45 (1965).
99. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,
§ 1, 79 Stat. 911, 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
100. See id. § 2,79 Stat, at 911-12.
101. See id, § 3, 79 Stat. at 912-13 (establishing preference system).
102. See id. § 1, 79 Stat. at 911.
103. See id. § 8, 79 Stat. at 916 (defining "special immigrant" to mean native of an
independent foreign country of the Western Hemisphere or Canal Zone, and the spouse
and children of such person, as well as other certain other categories of person, such as
permanent resident aliens returning from a temporary trip abroad, and certain active or
retired employees of the United States government); id. § 21, 79 Stat. at 920-21 (providing
that, effective July 1, 1968, immigration of "special immigrants" based on their Western
Hemisphere nativity may not exceed 120,000 per year).
104. See id. § 21(e), 79 Stat. at 921.
105. See, e.g., TAKAKI, supra note 41, at 418 ("Seeking to promote anti-Communism
abroad and to present itself as a democracy to peoples engaged in anticolonialist struggles
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House Judiciary Subcommittee responsible for immigration, noted
that "[o]ur Secretary of State and two Attorneys General have testi-
fied that the quota system has made problems in the conduct of our
relations with certain foreign countries.""'u Senator Hiram Fong ex-
pressed the views of many in Congress when he argued that the quota
limitations "hurt America's image as the leader of the free world."'0 7
The importance of the foreign policy was highlighted by argu-
ments that Americans were once again engaged in an Asian ground
war. Representative John Lindsay noted:
[T]his nation has committed itself to the defense of the in-
dependence of South Vietnam. Yet the quota for that
country of 15 million is exactly 100. Apparently we are
willing to risk a major war for the right of the 'Vietnamese
people to live in freedom at the same time our quota system
makes it clear that we do not want very great numbers of
them to live with us."'
Tip O'Neill observed that the "current policy ... presents the
ironic situation in which we are willing to send our American youth
to aid these people in their struggle against Communist aggression
in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, the United States felt compelled to abandon the na-
tional-origins quota."); id (noting the important role of the Civil Rights Movement in
awakening "the moral conscience of America"); Abba P. Schwartz, Foreign and Domestic
Implications of U.S. Immigration Laws, 50 DEP'T ST. BULL. 675 passim (1964) (discussing
foreign policy difficulties caused by McCarran-Walter); Torok, supra note 41, at 11-12;
Chen, supra note 45, at 132-33.
106. 111 CONG. REC. 21,585 (1965); see also id. at 21,590 (remarks of Rep. Arch
Moore, Jr.). For the State Department's views on the 1965 law, see Dean Rusk, Foreign
Policy Aspects of Proposals to Revise Immigration Law, 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 384 passim
(1965) and Dean Rusk, The Reform of our Basic Immigration Law, 52 DEP'T ST. BULL.
806 passim (1965).
107. 111 CONG. REC. 24,447 (1965). Senator Fong continued:
Many countries of Asia and the Pacific have traditionally sought more than a to-
ken of immigration to the United States. These are the countries that will play a
large and vital role in determining the future course of world events. Their
friendship is crucial to all those who are fighting to preserve freedom.
Id. at 24,467.
Representative Joseph Addabbo noted that "[t]he national origins system is dis-
criminatory, and it gives a bad image to our friends overseas." Id. at 21,768. Other
members of the House made similar remarks. See id. at 21,777 (remarks of Rep. John
Dent); id. at 21,781 (remarks of Rep. William Ryan); id. at 21,783-84 (remarks of Rep.
Lester Wolff); id. at 21,784 (remarks of Rep. Leonard Farbstein); id. at 21,787 (remarks
of Rep. Jeffery Cohelan); id. at 21,787 (remarks of Rep. Joseph Huot). Representative
Jonathan Bingham informed his colleagues that from his "experience as an Ambassador
to the United Nations, and from discussions with diplomats from the Far East, ... Asians
feel very strongly about this discrimination." Id. at 21,793. Senator Philip Hart pointed
out that "[t]o State Department officials, the bill represents a public relations coup ....
Id. at 24,240.
108. Id at 21,769.
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while at the same time, we are indicating that they are not good
enough to be Americans. '' O Jacob Javitsn° and Edward Kennedy
made the same point."'
B. Racial Egalitarian Motivation
Although foreign policy was a major motivation for the change
in immigration policy towards Asians, it was not the sole motivation.
Many commentators understand the 1965 Act as principled anti-
racist legislation, at least to some degree."' Congressional discussion
109. Id. at 21,790.
110. See id. at 24,470.
111. See id. at 24,777. Senator Kennedy remarked:
We have sent tens of thousands of American soldiers to Vietnam to defend the
people of that country because we believe that as free people they are worthy of
our support. But if the finest citizen of Vietnam wanted to come and live in
America today, he would have to wait for many years.
Id.
112. See, e.g., VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN
LABOR FORCE 62 (1984) ("Just as overt racism could no longer be tolerated in the way
citizens treated their fellow citizens, neither could it be sanctioned in the laws that gov-
erned the way in which noncitizens were considered for immigrant status."); DANIELS,
supra note 12, at 338 (noting that the Civil Rights Act, Voting Rights Act and Immigra-
tion Act "represent a kind of high-water mark in a national consensus of egalitarianism");
MALDWYN ALLEN JONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 266 (2d ed. 1992). Jones wrote:
By the early 1960's, however, anti-Communist paranoia had waned, racial and
ethnic stereotypes had lost some of their force, and Americans had become
more tolerant of diversity. There was also growing awareness that the country
was chronically short of skilled labor. Even so, it was not until Johnson's land-
slide victory in the 1964 presidential election had given Congress a more liberal
complexion that reform at last reached its goal.
Id.; see also RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MUL-
TICULTURAL AMERICA 400-01 (1993) ("Moral consistency compelled lawmakers to
remove the barriers to Asian immigration, and in 1965, Congress enacted a new immigra-
tion law... . By abolishing discrimination against Asian immigrants, this new law
represented a sharp ideological departure from the traditional view of America as a ho-
mogeneous white society .... "); Nathan Glazer, Introduction to CLAMOR AT THE GATES:
THE NEW AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 3, 7 (Nathan Glazer ed., 1985) (referring to the
"liberal and open spirit of 1965" and the "moral satisfaction of passing a non-
discriminatory immigration act"); Garnet K. Emery, Comment, The American Dream-
For the Lucky Ones: The United States' Confused Immigration Policy, 12 U. ARK. LITrLE
ROCK L.J. 755, 762 (1989) ("The 1965 Amendments were most likely motivated by the
civil rights movement .... "); Elliot Fertik, Comment, Reforming the Immigrant Investor
Program of the Immigration Act of 1990, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 649, 651 (1995) ("The
1965 reforms rejected the national quota system established in 1924 and the discrimina-
tory principles upon which it was based." (citations omitted)); Mary Jane Lapointe, Note,
Discrimination in Asylum Law: The Implications of Jean v. Nelson, 62 IND. L.J. 127, 132-
33 (1986) (comparing 1965 law to other contemporaneous civil rights legislation); Kath-
erine Terrell, Note, The Simpson-Mazzoli Bilk Employer Sanctions and Immigration
Reform, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 987, 992 (1985) ("In 1965 Congress abolished the
national origins quotas. This immigration reform was made in response to the dawning
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of the 1965 amendments supports this conclusion. Many legislators
contended that the laws should be changed because racial and na-
tional distinctions were bad in principle, not because of some
particular exigency. Senator Edward M. Kennedy argued that the
national origins quota system was "contrary to our basic principles as
a nation.'.. Senator Joseph Clark insisted that "[t]he national origins
quotas and the Asian-Pacific [sic] triangle provisions are irrational,
arrogantly intolerant, and immoral." '114 Representative Paul Krebs
argued that the national origins system was "repugnant to our na-
tional traditions," and that "[w]e must learn to judge each individual
by his own worth and by the value he can bring to our Nation.""
Representative Dominick Daniels argued that "[r]acism simply has
no place in America in this day and age.""' 6 These kinds of arguments
had been largely absent from debates in 1943 and 1952.1"
This change in attitude apparently extended to Asians. Repre-
sentative Leonard Farbstein stated to his colleagues that he could not
"believe that there is any Member of this House who would say a
word in defense" of the Asia-Pacific triangle provision.' Senator
Kennedy announced that he was "especially gratified that we are
wiping out the Asia-Pacific triangle.... [A]fter almost 100 years,
Asian peoples are no longer discriminated against in the immigration
laws of our country.""' 9
Others compared the bill to measures designed to eliminate do-
social consciousness of racial discrimination within the United States, as reflected in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.") (citing Charles B. Keely, Immigration Policy and the New Im-
migration, 1965-76, in SOURCEBOOK ON THE NEW IMMIGRATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COWMUNITY 15, 24 (Roy S. Bryce-
Laporte ed., 1980)) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK ON THE NEW IMMIGRATION]; see also
Daniel H. Foote, Japan's "Foreign Workers" Policy: A View from the United States, 7
GEO. IMMIGR. L.. 707, 711 (1993) ("[S]ince... 1965, the United States has taken great
strides toward achieving an immigration system based on universal standards; and the
commitment today to a system free from racial bias appears to be supported by broad
national consensus .... ").
113. 111 CONG. REc. 24,225 (1965).
114. Id. at 24,501. It was unjust, Senator Clark continued, that "[a] brilliant Korean or
Indian scientist is turned away, while the northern European is accepted almost without
question." Id.
115. Id. at 21,778.
116. Id. at 21,787.
117. Surely some members of Congress held racially egalitarian views in those years,
but they may have concluded that such an argument would be unpersuasive to the major-
ity.
118. 111 CONG. REC. 21,785 (1965); see also id. at 21,792 (remarks of Rep. Brademas)
(noting that the bill "will repeal the Asia-Pacific triangle which has too long been an in-
sult to those of oriental ancestry").
119. Id. at 24,227.
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mestic discrimination, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. Reflecting the views of many, Represen-
tative Laurence Burton argued: "Just as we sought to eliminate
discrimination in our land through the Civil Rights Act, today we
seek by phasing out the national origins quota system to eliminate
discrimination in immigration to this Nation composed of the de-
scendants of immigrants. ' ' 20
Whether or not aliens had a right to immigrate on a race-neutral
basis, officials recognized that racism in immigration was a civil rights
issue because of its effect on Americans. Dean Rusk, for example,
observed that immigration policy had significant domestic, as well as
foreign, effects:
[G]iven the fact that we are a country of many races and na-
tional origins, that those who built this country and
developed it made decisions about opening our doors to the
rest of the world; that anything which makes it appear that
we, ourselves, are discriminating in principle about particu-
lar national origins, suggests that we think ... less well of
our own citizens of those national origins, than of other citi-
zens ... 121
120. Id. at 21,783; see also id. at 21,765 (remarks of Rep. Sweeney) (making similar
observation); id. at 21,768 (remarks of Rep. Giaimo); id. at 21,783 (remarks of Rep.
Wolff); itt. at 21,784 (remarks of Rep. Farbstein); id. at 21,796 (remarks of Rep. Gal-
lagher) (mentioning Voting Rights Act); id. at 24,446 (remarks of Sen. Fong)
("Elimination of racial barriers against citizens of other lands is a logical extension of
eliminating discrimination against American citizens."); id. at 24,563 (remarks of Sen.
Edward Kennedy).
121. Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 390; see also id. at 410 (remarks of At-
torney General Robert Kennedy) (noting that the bill "would remove from our law a
discriminatory system of selecting immigrants that is a standing affront to millions of our
citizens"); Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 9 (remarks of Attorney General Katzen-
bach) ("I do not know how any American could fail to be offended by a system which
presumes that some people are inferior to others solely because of their birthplace....
The harm it does to the United States and to its citizens is incalculable."); Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary on S. 1932 and other Legislation Relating to the Immigration Quota System, 88th
Cong. 31 (1964) (unpublished) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1932] (remarks of Sen. Robert
Keating). Keating stated:
Moreover, by eliminating from the law the pernicious implications of racial infe-
riority contained in the Asia-Pacific Triangle provisions, the United States would
no longer be in the position of having on its books a legal slap in the face of our
... own citizens of Asian background who can be justly proud of their record of
attainments as Americans.
Id.
Even opponents of reform, such as W.B. Hicks, Jr., Executive Director of the Liberty
Lobby, understood this point. IIicks acknowledged the insult to Americans when the law
discriminated against those of similar ethnic or national backgrounds:
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C. The Unintended Reform?
The evidence to this point suggests that the 1965 bill was a
genuine repudiation of the discriminatory laws of the past, for Asians
as well as for the African and southern and eastern European nation-
als whose opportunities to immigrate were limited by the national
origins quota system. Yet, in spite of the racially egalitarian tenor of
congressional and administration statements, a number of immigra-
tion scholars and historians,m as well as leading anti-immigration
I would like to say that the people I have seen, the witnesses, coming before this
committee to object to the quota system have made a very deep impression on
me. Apparently the quota system is not an insult to foreigners so much as it is to
Americans of foreign parentage of identifiable racial strains such as the Italian-
Americans and Chinese-Americans, who feel that the quotas make them less
valuable or that Congress feels they are less valuable as American citizens than
others, and I can well understand their feelings. I think the people who sub-
scribe to Liberty Lobby would agree with me on this, that we do not like the idea
of discrimination based on race resulting in a feeling of being insulted on the
part of our American citizens.
Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 852.
122. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, GUNS OR BuIrER: THE PRESIDENCY OF LYNDON
JOHNSON 259 (1996) ("No one anticipated the dramatic changes that would soon take
place."); BRIGGS, supra note 112, at 79; DANIELS, supra note 12, at 341, 344 ("Clearly,
the 1965 law has not worked out as its proponents expected. The experts simply did not
know what they were talking about.. ."); JONES, supra note 112, at 267 (claiming that the
massive increase in Asian immigration "was entirely unexpected"); REIMERS, supra note
10, at 73-76 (noting that many thought Asian immigration would not increase; citing, inter
alia, Rep. Celler); ELIZABETH ROLPH, IMMIGRATION POLICIES: LEGACY FROM THE
1980s AND ISSUES FOR THE 1990S, at 10 (1992) (noting that Congressional interest in
change in immigration law was spurred by "certain unanticipated consequences of the
1965 immigration reforms" including increase in Asian immigration); STEPHEN STE-
INBERG, THE ETHNIC MYTH 268 (1989) (noting that the dramatic increase in Asian
immigration was "not fully anticipated at the time of its enactment"); TAKAKI, supra note
41, at 419; UEDA, supra note 52, at 45; PHILIP Q. YANG, POST-1965 IMMIGRATION TO
THE UNITED STATES 18,21 (1995) (noting that "both Congress and the Johnson Admini-
stration expected only a slight increase in Asian immigration" as a result of the 1965
Amendment); Franklin Abrams, Immigration Law and its Enforcement: Reflections on
American Immigration, in SOURCEBOOK ON THE NEW IMMIGRATION, supra note 112, at
27 (stating that immigration of Asian professionals was unexpected); Edna Bonacich et
al., Korean Immigrant: Small Business in Los Angeles, in SOURCEBOOK ON THE NEW
IMMIGRATION 167, supra note 112, at 167 ("An unanticipated consequence of the new
law has been a sharp rise in immigration from Asia."); Glazer, supra note 112, at 7; Na-
than Glazer, The Closing Door, in ARGUING IMMIGRATION 37, 39 (Nicolaus Mills ed.,
1994); Elizabeth Midgely, Comings and Goings in U.S. Immigration Policy, in THE
UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE: U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE 1980s, at 52 (Demetrios Pa-
pademetriou & Mark Miller eds., 1983) (stating that "not all of the effects of the new
system in practice were anticipated" including the increase in Asian immigration); The
New Immigrants, 5 CQ RESEARCHER 108, 108 (1995) (noting that one of the "effects of
the new law [was] a largely unanticipated rise in immigration from... Asia"); David M.
Reimers, An Unintended Reform: The 1965 Immigration Act and Third World Immigra-
tion to the United States, 3 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 9, 25 (1983); Peter Schuck, The Emerging
Political Consensus on Immigration Law, 5 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 1, 7 (1991) ("Kennedy ad-
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activists,m argue that there was no thought that the Asian proportion
of the immigration stream would change as a result of the 1965 law.
More specifically, Robert Tucker is one of the few who suggest that
some increase was expected: "Asian immigration was expected to
rise only very modestly as a result of the new legislation."' 1  By con-
trast, Professor Vernon Briggs of Cornell writes that "it was
anticipated that passage of the Immigration Act of 1965 would lead
to a decline in Asian immigration."' '
Perhaps George Borjas captures the consensus view when he
writes that "[i]t is conceivable that some of the framers of the 1965
amendments saw the family-reunification provisions as a way of pre-
serving the status quo in the national-origin mix of the U.S.
population, without having to resort to explicit racial or national-
origin restrictions. '  Similarly, Bill Ong Hing explains that the 1965
law was "driven by [America's] desire to be seen as the egalitarian
champion of the 'free world'" but that "Asian immigration after
1965 took the United States by surprise"' ' because "little attention
was paid to what, if any, impact the reforms might have on Asian
ministration officials predicted that only 5,000 Asians would migrate in the first year and
virtually none thereafter .... "); David Stewart, Immigration Laws Are Education Laws
Too, 75 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 556,556-57 (1994); Jan C. Ting, "Other Than a Chinaman":
How U.S. Immigration Law Resulted From and Still Reflects a Policy of Excluding and
Restricting Asian Immigration, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 301, 307 (1995); Roger
Waldinger, US Immigration Policy in the 1980s, 10 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 370, 372
(1987) (reviewing REIMERS, supra note 10); Miguel Lawson & Marianne Grin, Note, The
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 StaL 4978, 33 HARv. INT'L L.J. 255,
256 (1992) ("[IThe 1965 Act had the unintended effect of drastically limiting European
immigration to the United States and increasing Hispanic and Asian immigration."); Ste-
phen Wagner, The Lingering Death of the National Origins Quota System: A Political
History of United States Immigration Policy, 1952-1965, at 470 (1986) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University) (copy on file with author).
123. See AUSTER, supra note 14, at 21-22; BRIMELOW, supra note 13, at 76-78.
124. This idea has also been embraced by the popular press. See, e.g., Steve Johnson,
Asians Mindful of U.S. History of Prejudice, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWs, June 1, 1993, at
6A ("[W]hen a 1965 law finally let them come in significant numbers, it was largely unin-
tended.... Congress assumed few Asians would actually come.").
125. Robert Tucker, Immigration and Foreign Policy: General Considerations, in
IMMIGRATION AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 9 (Robert Tucker et al. eds.,
1990).
126. VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR. & STEPHEN MOORE, STILL AN OPEN DOOR? U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 19 (1994). Professor Briggs also
stated that "some interest groups saw family reunification as a way to perpetuate the old
national origins systems under a guise that was more politically acceptable." Id. at 17.
127. GEORGE J. BORiAs, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON
THE U.S. ECONOMY 32 (1990).
128. HING, supra note 30, at 79.
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American communities." m Many scholars cite Robert Kennedy's
prediction that 5,000 Asian immigrants would come in the year after
the act became law.- Given that 5,000 was a fraction of the annual
Asian immigration under the McCarran-Walter Act, reliance on this
figure suggests that many scholars really believe that Asian immigra-
tion was not expected to increase at all.
The claim that post-1965 Asian immigration was unexpected
seems to be not merely that no one considered the issue one way or
the other, but that policymakers had a conscious belief that Asianimmigration would not increase significantly or would actually de-
cline. The literature's repeated assertion of this point is significant
because it implies that knowledge would have been material-that
the law might have been structured differently-had the risk of in-
creased Asian immigration been perceived. Not only do professors
Reimersm and Daniels 2 suggest that the bill may have been condi-
tioned on an assumption of no significant change in. the makeup of'
the immigrant stream, but this "unintended consequence" is cited by
restrictionists as a reason to scrap the law.' If it is true that a deter-
minative assumption underlying the law was that few Asians would
immigrate, it necessarily means that the law was not really intended
to eliminate race as a factor from America's immigration laws. m
The prevailing scholarly view does not give Congress enough
credit. Close examination of the legislative history and interviews
with people involved in the bill suggest that Congress knew more
Asians would immigrate. The most probable view is that legislators
and administration officials knew that Asian immigration would in-
crease substantially, even if no one predicted the actual magnitude,
129. Id. at 39.
130. See infra notes 215-35 and accompanying text.
131. See REIMERS, supra note 10, at 76 ("What [Congress] would have done if this
issue were clear in 1965 is, of course, unknown.").
132. See DANIELS, supra note 12, at 338 ("[H]ad the Congress fully understood its
consequences, [the 1965 Act] almost certainly would not have passed.").
133. See supra note 14.
134. It would be perfectly consistent for a member of Congress to conclude as an em-
pirical matter that more, fewer, or the same number of non-whites would immigrate
under a racially neutral system, or not to think about the consequences at all, and still be
an anti-racist. But if a member of Congress voted for the 1965 Act on the condition that
there would be no change, that person could not fairly claim to be opposed to race as a
factor in immigration, any more than could a legislator who voted for the 1964 Civil
Rights Act only on the condition that African-Americans remain in segregated and infe-
rior jobs. Someone willing to change racially discriminatory law.; only if there is no
change in substance is not an anti-racist.
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which was probably greater than expected.' In this context, it would
be easy to confuse an outcome that seems inevitable in retrospect and
one that was actually known at the time. Nevertheless, a number of
factors suggest that congressional and Administration officials knew
that the likely outcome of liberalization would be an increase in
Asian immigration. If Congress knew, then the question of what
Congress would have done had they known becomes nonsensical-
Congress knew and the 1965 Act is what they did in the face of that
knowledge.
1. Contemporary Recollections of Participants
A number of participants shared their recollections-some
faded-of the drafting and adoption of the 1965 legislation. When
trying to determine what people meant by particular actions, what
they say has some bearing.16 The responses were remarkably uni-
form. President Gerald R. Ford, for example, was the House
minority leader in 1965, and a supporter of the bill. He remembers
that Asian immigration was expected to increase substantially. "As I
recall, it was anticipated that the 1965 Amendments would substan-
tially increase the number of Asian immigrants. As the Republican
Leader in the House of Representatives at the time, I favored that
result."'37
The bill came out of the Democratic-controlled House Judiciary
Committee, and its Subcommittee Number One, which was responsi-
ble for immigration.m Peter Rodino, Jr., later Chairman of the
135. The absolute numbers of immigrants of all nationalities exceeded, in some years,
the numbers predicted by Congress in 1965. See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 12, at 340-44.
136. I do not mean to weigh in on the controversy over using legislative history to
construe statutes. See Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The
Plain Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413,425-
31 (1993) (discussing debate and collecting authorities). First, no one questions that the
1965 Act eliminated the national origins quota system and formal consideration of race
from the immigration laws. Moreover, this Article examines what Congress and the Ad-
ministration thought they were doing when they changed the law. In answering this
question, legislative history and other evidence is surely relevant. At the same time, the
"'plain meaning'" rule-that the best evidence of congressional purpose is the "plain
meaning of the text"-renders doubtful the claim that the racial diversification of the
immigration stream was accidental. See id. at 426. It is implausible that Congress did not
know that ending discrimination would create opportunities for previously excluded
groups.
137. Letter from President Gerald R. Ford to Gabriel J. Chin, Assistant Professor of
Law, Western New England College School of Law 1 (Jan. 29, 1996) (on file with author).
138. See CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY 1966, at 217 (Charles Brownson ed.,
1966) (noting that Subcommittee No. 1 had "[s]pecial jurisdiction over immigration and
nationality").
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House Judiciary Committee itself, recognized that there was enor-
mous unsatisfied immigration demand in Asia."9 Representative
Rodino recognized at the time that the increase in Asian immigration
"could be substantial.""' Judiciary Committee member Robert Kas-
tenmeier also expected that "many more Asians would be coming to
the United States.'.. Subcommittee member Don Edwards recalled
that he knew "there would be more" Asian immigrants.42 Jack
Brooks,' Charles Mathias,' and Arch Moore,'45 all members of the
Immigration Subcommittee, also anticipated increased Asian immi-
gration, although not at the level that actually occurred.
According to Dale DeHaan, then advisor to Senator Edward
Kennedy, supporters of the bill in the Senate recognized that more
Asians would be coming. 46 Aware of some scholarly opinions to the
contrary, DeHaan disagrees with them. 47
Kennedy and Johnson Administration officials who worked on
the bill had no doubt about its effects. Washington attorney Myer
Feldman was Deputy White House Counsel to President Kennedy
and White House Counsel to President Johnson.'48 Feldman states
139. See Telephone Interview with Peter Rodino, Jr., Retired Member of Congress
(Mar. 8, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
140. Id. at 9.
141. Telephone Interview with Robert Kastenmeier, Retired Iember of Congress
(Jan. 12, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
142. Telephone Interview with Don Edwards, Retired Member of Congress (Jan. 16,
1996) (transcript on file with author).
143. See Letter from Jack Brooks, Retired Member of Congress, to Gabriel J. Chin,
Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law 1 (Jan. 17,
1996) (on file with author) ("As I recall the thought was that a few more Asians would
enter and that it would modify the national origin system which had limited the number of
Asian immigrants for a few years.").
144. See Telephone Interview with Charles Mathias, Retired United States Senator
(Feb. 9, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
145. See Telephone Interview with Arch Moore, Jr., Retired Governor of West Vir-
ginia and Member of Congress (Jan. 18,1996) (transcript on file with author).
146. See Letter from Gabriel J. Chin, Assistant Professor of Law, Western New Eng-
land College School of Law, to Dale DeHaan, Former Staff Member for Senator Edward
M. Kennedy 1 (Dec. 16, 1995) (on file with author) (containing transcribed notes of inter-
view). After leaving Senate service, Mr. DeHaan remained active in refugee and
immigration matters. He was director of immigration and refugee services for the Na-
tional Council of Churches and the Church World Service, and later U.N. Deputy High
Commissioner for Refugees. In 1990, he was named to the U.S. Commission for the
Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development. See Robert
Pear, Centralized Immigration Control Urged, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1990, at A22
(announcing Commissioner DeHaan's appointment).
147. See Letter from Gabriel J. Chin to Dale DeHaan, supra note 146, at 1.
148. See 1 WHo's WHO IN AMERICA 1274 (50th ed. 1996).
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that both Kennedy and Johnson believed that "[w]hether the immi-
grant was from Asia, Africa, Italy or eastern Europe, or whether the
immigrant was from England, France or Belgium, was not an accept-
able basis for discrimination between them." '149 Speaking of Asian
immigration, Feldman writes: "[W]e did expect there would be an
increase and we welcomed it."'m
Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach was Deputy Attorney General
under Kennedy before becoming Attorney General under Johnson.'
Katzenbach said recently that he was "surprised [but] not astounded"
at the percentage of non-white immigration under the 1965 Act, but
that he would not have been surprised at the time the bill was passed
if fifty percent turned out to be non-white."' Although the details,
such as Southeast Asian immigration following the Vietnam War,
could not have been anticipated, "the general phenomenon" of in-
creased Asian immigration "should have been predictable, [and he]
think[s] was" predictable when the bill was passed." W. Willard
Wirtz, then Secretary of Labor, generally shares Attorney General
Katzenbach's views.'
Norbert A. Schlei,'5 Assistant Attorney General in the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel under Robert Kennedy,
worked on the original draft of the bill with Adam Walinsky.S Both
149. Letter from Myer Feldeman, Former White House Counsel, to Gabriel J. Chin,
Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law 1-2 (Feb. 2,
1996) (on file with author).
150. Id. at 2.
151. During his remarks on the floor of the Senate, Robert Kennedy thanked 10 peo-
ple for their work on the bill including Adam Walinsky; the first two names mentioned
were Attorney General Katzenbach and Assistant Attorney General Schlei. See 111
CONG. REC. 24,498 (1965).
152. See Telephone Interview with Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Former Attor-
ney General (May 20, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
153. Id.
154. See Telephone Interview with W. Willard Wirtz, Former Secretary of Labor
(Aug. 7, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
155. Schlei's background is remarkable; editor-in-chief of the Yale Law Journal and
first in his graduating class, he clerked for Justice Harlan on the Supreme Court and co-
authored a prize-winning book with Yale Professor Myers McDougall. See 2 WHo's WHO
IN AMERICA, supra note 148, at 3705. Six years out of law school, he was an Assistant
Attorney General under Robert Kennedy, where he advised the White House on such
matters as the Cuban Missile Crisis and integration of the University of Mississippi. See
i.
156. Since leaving the Justice Department, in addition to practicing law in New York,
Walinsky has been one of the most provocative and interesting critics of the criminal jus-
tice system. See Adam Walinsky, The Crisis of Public Order, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July
1995, at 39, 39; 140 CONG. REc. S124965-01 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1994) (noting Walinsky's
ultimately successful efforts to establish a Police Corps, which occurred in 1994 by virtue
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recall that Asian immigration was expected to increase; Walinsky
points out that "you'd have to be a real dope not to know that the
number would go up."' Thomas Ehrlich, President Emeritus of In-
diana University and now a Stanford professor, worked on the
original draft of the bill when he -was on the legal staff of the State
Department." He says that he and Assistant Secretary of State
Abba Schwartz intended to "open up the gates, and ... it happened
just [that] way[." ' u
In sum, even filtered through thirty years of memory, the consis-
tency of Republican and Democrat, House and Senate, Congress and
Administration, suggest that these recollections are worth consider-
ing. It is, of course, conceivable that these recollections are self-
serving, that the sincere anti-racism which the substance of the re-
marks suggest has been tailored to fit some notion of political
prudence."6 For two reasons, this seems implausible. First, save only
perhaps the Reconstruction Congresses, many of these men come
from Congresses and Administrations more sympathetic to civil
rights than any in American history. If some of these men were not
sincerely in favor of civil rights, then we have never had elected offi-
cials who were. Second, their recollections are supported by the
contemporaneous record of consideration of the bill.
People thinking about immigration, years before the results of
the 1965 Act were known, predicted that ending discrimination
against Asians would result in more of them coming over. For exam-
ple, in his 1963 book American Immigration Policies, former
Congressman Marion T. Bennett criticized Senator Philip Hart's 1962
proposal to end quota preferences for Northern European nations.
Bennett wrote:
China and India... would... ultimately be the European-
of Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XX, § 200104, 108 Stat. 2049, 2050 (1994) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 14093 (1993))).
157. Telephone Interview with Adam Walinsky, Former Attorney, Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice (May 31, 1995) (transcript on file with author); see also id.
(noting that the Chinese quota was around 100, he asks, rhetorically, "How could any-
body think when we were repealing the Asia-Pacific Triangle that you wouldn't get a
significant increase in immigration from China? That just doesn't make any sense. It's
just stupid."); Telephone Interview with Norbert Schlei, Former Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral (Dec. 18,1995) (transcript on file with author).
158. See 1 WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA, supra note 148, at 1173.
159. Telephone Interview with Thomas Ehrlich, President Emeritus, Indiana Univer-
sity and Former Attorney, State Department (Feb. 9, 1996) (transcript on file with
author).
160. I did not see any particular evidence of this. Indeed, many of these men are now
retired from public life.
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successor to our immigration largesse. The 1961 Indian cen-
sus reported 438 million people in that country. The 1953
Chinese census reported 583 million Chinese and in 1962
President Kennedy said there were 650 million in Commu-
nist China alone. The possibility that they might not take
advantage of relaxed immigration restrictions is remote.
Their quotas have been oversubscribed for years. One of
the arguments advanced for greater Chinese immigration is
that the Chinese quota is only 205 annually. It is pertinent
to note, however.., that nonquota Chinese immigration is
much greater than the world average of two and one-half
times quota immigration."
What is obvious in retrospect was also observed at the time: Liber-
alization would mean benefits for countries with large populations
and high immigration demand.
2. Legislative History: Asian Immigration Will Increase
In 1964 and 1965, there seems to have been no serious question
that the racial demographics of the immigration stream would
change. In what might have been the first use of the term "the new
immigration" in the context of the 1965 Act, Senator Edward Ken-
nedy explained that Americans need not fear the people who would
be brought in under the bill: "[T]he people who comprise the new
immigration-the type which this bill would give preference to-are
relatively well educated and well to do. They are familiar with
American ways. ' ' Kennedy argued only that the change would not
be traumatic, not that there would be no change.
If only southern and eastern European immigration would be in-
creased, then the following exchange about security measures
between Representative Michael Feighan and State Department offi-
cial Abba Schwartz makes little sense:
MR. FEIGHAN. The reason I ask [about changes in security
procedures] is that the existing patterns of immigration to
the United States have been in force for some time, thus
permitting the development of security techniques and pro-
cedures which fit those patterns. The administration
proposal could very well change those patterns to such an
extent that you would be required to operate in new and un-
161. BENNETr, supra note 16, at 274 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Hart later
introduced the bill which became the 1965 Act. See also Editorial New Quota for Old,
BOSTON REC. AM., Jan. 16, 1965 (noting irony that "those nations with large numbers of
people who would like to emigrate to the U.S. are generally allotted the smallest quota").
162. 111 CONG. REC. 24,228 (1965).
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charted waters. Is that a realistic possibility?
MR. SCHWARTZ. We certainly believe you are correct, Mr.
Chairman. There may be people coming in greater numbers
from different areas of the world. That certainly would be
taken into account. I can imagine that if numbers were to
increase of persons coming from areas where we do not
have extensive personnel, or experienced people, that cer-
tainly would have an effect and we would have to take care
of that.o
Senator Paul Douglas made no bones about the effect of the bill: "I
would say the fundamental question is simply this. Should we not
admit more of the hundreds of thousands of people in eastern
Europe, southern Europe, southeastern Europe and Asia who want
to come here... [?,,"
If Asian immigration volume was expected to rise insignificantly,
that fact was kept secret from the many witnesses who predicted a
substantial increase in Asian immigration. If few subscribed to wit-
ness Rosalind Frame's prediction that after forty years ofimmigration under the new law, there could be more than 114 million
Chinese living in the United States,1" a number of groups, including
The Citizens for a Sensible, Security-Minded Immigration Law,' and
The Daughters of the American Revolution," among several oth-
163. Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 511-12 (emphasis added). The Admini-
stration draft of the bill gave the President discretion to give Ireland, Germany and
England extra visas over and above the ordinary per-country limitation. Dean Rusk ex-
plained:
This is partly because we do not wish to interrupt too precipitantly longstanding
patterns of movement of peoples from those countries who have long sent us
substantial numbers of emigrants [sic]. I think it would work a hardship if we
were to apply this 10-percent rule right away to some of the countries who have
been sending us large numbers every year.
Id. at 403 (emphasis added). President Johnson's message to Congress proposed a five-
year phase-in of the new law, so that the "possibility of abrupt changes in the pattern of
immigration from any nation [could be] eliminated." H.R. EXEC. DOC. 89-52, at 2 (1965),
reprinted in 10 TRELLES & BAILEY, supra note 38, doe. 68 (emphasis added). In fact,
Congress adopted a three year phase-in period. See infra note 207 (discussing this provi-
sion). The Senate Judiciary Committee report explained that "[diuring the interim, this
procedure will not affect the flow of immigration from large quota countries." S. REP.
No. 89-748, at 14 (1965), reprinted in 11 TRELLES & BAILEY, supra note 38, doe. 73
(emphasis added).
164. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 167.
165. See id. at 821.
166. See Hearings on H.R 7700, supra note 38, at 1012 ("Asia and Africa... [will]
receive the largest quotas.").
167. See id. at 736 ("[S]uch a change in our existing laws would appear to be an out-
right accommodation to the heaviest population explosions throughout the world-India,
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ers,16 agreed that the bill would offer advantages to "immigrants
from the overpopulated, socially, and economically deprived coun-
tries, such as China, India, and Africa [sic]."1 69
Many witnesses and legislators also recognized that existing law
was unfair to would-be Asian immigrants; and that there was un-
Asia, and Africa. Certainly these countries could naturally be expected to take full ad-
vantage of such an increased quota opportunity.").
168. Mrs. Myra C. Hacker testified that the Hart bill "would realine [sic] quotas to
countries and be based on the relation of their populations to world population." Id. at
764. Representatives of the Greenwich Women's Republican Club explained that immi-
grants "will begin to come more and more from Asia where the pressures of the
population explosion are felt most heavily." Id. at 819. Another commentator explained:
In the preamble to the Constitution, the founders of this great Republic made it
abundantly clear that they were leaving the fruits of their struggle as a legacy to
us, their "posterity." We, their posterity, are either emigrants, or descendants of
emigrants, from the white nations of northern Europe in the majority .... We are
neither Asiatic nor African.
Id. at 1017 (statement of Matthew McKeon); see also id. at 1014 (statement of Fla. State
Rep. George B. Stallings, Jr.) ("The enemies of [McCarran-Walter] do not like America
as it is, its institutions and its culture. They want to make America over in the image of
Asia, Africa, or eastern and southern Europe."); Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra note 93, at
443-44 (comments of Tyre Taylor of the Southern States Industrial Council) (noting thatimmigrants are typically the poorest people from "overpopulated, hunger-racked" na-
tions).
169. Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 664.
170. Senator Edward Kennedy said that elimination of the Asia-Pacific triangle con-
cept was "one of the most laudable aspects of the entire bill." 111 CONG. REc. 24,776
(1965). Senator Hart stated that "[d]iscriminatory provisions against immigrants from
eastern and southern Europe, token quotas for Asian and African countries, and implica-
tions of race superiority in the Asia-Pacific triangle concept, have no place in the public
policy of the United States." Id. at 24,238. Senator William Proxmire stated that the bill
"would break the pattern of inconsistency that has discriminated against immigration
from southern and eastern Europe and Asia." Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 857-
58. Representative William Ryan was one of many who recognized unfairness in the fact
that "[t]he quota for Ireland is larger than that for all of Asia." Hearings on H.R. 2580,
supra note 93, at 165; see also id. at 194 (remarks of Rep. Paul Fino) (making similar ob-
servation); Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 234 (remarks of Rep. Edward Patten)
("[T]he countries of India, China, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, and many others are
allowed only 100 people per year."); id. at 240 (remarks of Rep. Seymour Halpern)
(mentioning discrimination against Asia, among other areas); id. at 278 (remarks of Rep.
Harold Donohue); id. at 317 (remarks of Rep. John J. Rooney); 111 CONG. REC. 21,769
(1965) (remarks of Rep. John Lindsay); id. at 24,781 (remarks of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff)
(mentioning discrimination against southern and eastern Europe and Asia).
Oregon's Senator Neuberger quarreled on this point with Senator Ervin, who was
hesitant about reform. Ervin asked whether, given that one in four people in the world
was Chinese, Neuberger advocated admitting 65 million Chinese to the U.S. so they
would have the same representation here. Without quite agreeing, Neuberger did insist
that there had been unfairness: "I am even more concerned if there [sic] are one out of
four that they are not truly represented in our society. It shows we have been excluding
them for one reason alone and that is their ancestry." Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38,
at 551.
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satisfied immigration demand in Asia. Many officials recognized
that Asian immigration would increase. Edward Kennedy"' and At-
torney General Katzenbach'" predicted that would-be Asianimmigrants would benefit from the reforms.
Senator Ervin, ambivalent but ultimately a supporter of the bill,
seemed to assume that China and India7 ' would take the maximum
quota, and noted that the bill "would provide for at least possible,
substantial increases in immigration from" a list of countries with
small quotas, including Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, China, Mongolia,
India, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Pakistan, Thailand, Western Samoa,
and Vietnam. 6 Representative George Miller of California, after
speaking of a U.S. Air Force Academy graduate of Japanese Ameri-
can ancestry, said "I feel that we can accept more people here or we
can perhaps better arrange the quotas to take in people from places
and areas that are now given an insufficient quota."'
171. Mrs. Ray Erb mentioned the long waiting lists in some Asian countries, see
Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 703-04, as did Senator Fong, see 111 CONG. REC.
24,447, 24,448 (1965), and Representatives Ryan, see id. at 21,781, and Yates, see id. at
21,793 (discussing "heavily mortgaged Eastern quotas").
David Carliner, testifying in support of the bill on behalf of the ACLU, pointed out
that in addition to unsatisfied immigration demand in Italy and Greece, there was also
unsatisfied demand
to some extent from Eastern Europe and from Asia. I think that under this bill
we redress the balance by letting those people come in, and in a historical sense,
to give the Chinese a preference today would perhaps be a discrimination in
their favor. But if someone has been getting a discrimination for 100 years, he
cannot complain if somebody else gets a discrimination for the next 100 years.
Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 448. According to Carliner, "[t]he critical problem is
that the people in Greece, in China, to some extent in India, are seeking to come here in
large numbers." Id. at 455.
Senator Leverett Saltonstall, after mentioning discriminatory effects against southern
and eastern Europe and Asia, explained: "Today there are many quota numbers avail-
able in some countries where there is little pressure for immigration, while in other areas,
where there are many persons who wish to immigrate to the United States, few quota
numbers are available and the quotas are heavily oversubscribed." 111 CONG. REC.
24,441 (1965). He mentioned five countries: China, Italy, Greece, Poland and Portugal.
See id.
172. According to Senator Kennedy, "[t]he principal beneficiaries of the new system
are those countries which have large backlogs of applicants for immigration, but have
relatively small quotas." Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 2. Kennedy named China
and Japan, and seven other countries. See id.
173. Katzenbach said southern and eastern Europe would benefit and "the Asian
countries would get some benefit." Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra note 93, at 23.
174. See Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 64,359,571.
175. See id. at 66,196,280, 530.
176. Id. at 210-11.
177. Hearings on H.R 7700, supra note 38, at 189.
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Representative Arch Moore, in explaining what the status of Ja-
pan, China and the Philippines would be after the bill was passed,
told Congress precisely how the system would work-20,000 per year
would be the upper limitation for them just as for every other coun-
try.178 As a result, the United States could "look forward to an
increased number of each of the groups... referred to.'' 179 Similarly,
Senator Fong stated that there was no need to fear that an increase of
Asian immigration would "upset the historical and cultural pattern of
American life. An objective examination of the facts dispels this fear
as groundless"1" because of historical patterns of Asian assimilation.
The argument that Americans should not fear more Asians surely
suggests that more would come.
Opponents of reform recognized that Asia would benefit. Rep-
resentative O.C. Fisher, an opponent, stated that "[t]here is simply no
way of estimating the number of refugees, Asiatics, Africans, and
others, who would be admissible .... The big increase under the
Celler proposal would come primarily from Africa, Asia, and some
from southern Europe."18' Even Representative Frank Chelf, a sub-
committee member who supported the national origins quota system,
said that the bill should be rejected, but Asian immigration should
increase:
As I recall ... in 1952 we ... recognized the Japanese, Ko-
reans, Chinese, and the others. In other words, the Asian
countries and this so-called affront of exclusion was re-
moved.
While I agree ... that this is only a token recognition-
and I also agree ... that there ought to be an additional rec-
ognition-how much, at this juncture, I am unable to say,
but in all good conscience and sincerity, I do agree ... we
should eventually recognize them by a larger number."
Senators Spessard Holland,'3 John McClellan " ' and Robert
178. See 111 CoNG. REC. 21,590 (1965).
179. Id. at 21,591. Representative Pelly stated that "[ilt is not that I register fear that
they might come in because they make wonderful citizens." Id. Moore added that
"[p]eople who attack what we are doing here today say that it will let millions of orientals
come into the United States," and found that result unlikely. Id.
180. Id. at 24,467.
181. Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra note 93, at 157-58.
182. Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 393; see also id. at 847 (statement by
Rep. Chelf) (stating to Chinese-American witness: "I favor an increased quota for your
people.").
183. Senator Spessard Holland of Florida, a supporter of McCarran-Walter, noted:
[ihe bill, as it is now disclosed on the floor, assumes to open the door to immi-
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Byrd' also recognized that Asian immigration would increase.
In April of 1966, before the full effects of the new law could be
known, an Immigration and Naturalization Service employee writing
about the law was certain that Asian immigration would increase."
After discussing the elimination of the Asia-Pacific triangle provi-
sions, he wrote:
This amendment will have the effect of making immigrant
visas available to aliens who were previously chargeable to
quotas so greatly oversubscribed that visas could not be is-
sued to them for many years to come. The amendment will
lead to an increase in the number of visa petitions filed with
the Service. The fact that even the preference portions of
some quotas were heavily oversubscribed had discouraged
many relatives and prospective employers from filing peti-
tions to accord aliens a preference classification."8
He also recognized that the overall pattern of immigration would
change in favor of relatives and skilled immigrants, and non-
preference immigration would be virtually unavailable.'
gration to this country equally wide to people from all the countries of the world,
making no distinction between them .... [T]he Oriental, the African, the Mala-
yan, and various other people from all parts of the earth are to be equally
accepted for immigration into this country and for admission to citizenship.
All I am calling attention to is that many people in my State of Florida do not
agree with that principle, and they have objected to it.
I merely state that when we open our doors wide to all the oriental nations of
this earth, with some 700 to 800 million in 1 country alone, and with countless
other millions in other nations, and when we offer to admit them on terms of ex-
act equality with people from our own forefather nations, we are making a
radical departure of which I cannot, and do not approve.
111 CONG. REc. 24,778-79 (1965). Senator Robert Kennedy did not deny Holland's
claim: "The Senator talks about opening the doors wide. The doors are open only to
those who can make a contribution." Id. at 24,779.
184. Senator McClellan asked, "Will the addition of still more minority groups from all
parts of the world lessen or contribute to the increasing racial tensions and violence we
are currently witnessing on the streets of our major cities?" Id. at 24,556. "Remember
that under this bill, immigration will shift from those European countries that contributed
most to the formation of this Nation to the countries of Asia and Africa." Id. at 24,557.
185. See id at 23,794 ("[R]evising our immigration laws by removing the Asia-Pacific
triangle provisions will add to the many social problems that now confront us across the
Nation."). A West Virginia newspaper placed in the record claimed that Senator Robert
Byrd was concerned that elimination of the quota system "would swell the flow of immi-
grants from Asia and the newly emerging countries." Id. at 24,542.
186. See Robert Lindsey, The Act of October 3, 1965, 141 & N REP. 103,103 (1966).
187. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
188. He explained:
There was no need for an alien who was a native of England, Ireland or Ger-
many, for example, to seek a preference classification, when nonpreference visas
1996]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The news media did not overlook the likely effects of the 1965
law on Asian immigration. U.S. News & World Report was unambi-
guous: "Under rules just approved by Congress, officials forecast
these changes in the flow of immigrants to [the] U.S.... FROM
ASIA: Many more immigrants expected, since racial restrictions on
Indians and Orientals are wiped out."1 9 "Nobody has estimated the
number of Chinese who will apply to enter the U.S.," the magazine
reported, but "[t]he potential is large."'" Days after President John-
son signed the bill, the Christian Science Monitor reported that it
would contribute to a "multinational and multiracial United
States." '191 In November 1965, Scientific American, reporting on the
new law, noted that Asians, as well as Southern Europeans, would
have increased opportunities to immigrate." Other newspapers
agreed that the demographics of the immigration stream would
change 3 Indeed, the argument that an increase in Asian immigra-
tion is surprising is the revisionist view of the history of this law. A
1966 article in American Legion Magazine insisted that the multiplic-
ity of newspaper reports predicting an increase in Asian immigration
were readily available. However, on and after July 1, 1968, such aliens will be
competing for immigrant visas on equal terms with natives of countries which
heretofore have had heavily oversubscribed quotas, such as Greece, Italy and
*China. It is highly probable that af[t]er July 1, 1968, the pattern of recent years
Will be greatly changed, with all or nearly all of the immigrant visas subject to
the numerical limitation ... being issued to preference immigrants.
Id. at 111-12.
189. A New Mix for America's Melting Pot, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 11, 1965,
at 55, 55.
190. Id. at 57.
191. Saville Davis, Immigration Change, Papal Visit Mesh, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Oct. 5,1965, at 1.
192. See Equitable Immigration, SCI. AM., Nov. 1965, at 48.
193. See, e.g., Alien Bill Warning Is Issued, Cmi. TRIB., July 30, 1965, § 1A, at 12
(noting prediction by a witness that the Chinese-American population of the United
States would skyrocket if the bill passed); Willard Edwards, Alien Bill Called Democratic
Bid for Votes, Cmn. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1965, § 1A, at 4 (noting that bill will have the effect of
"increasing the flow from southern Europe and other areas whose flow is restricted under
the present system"); Immigration Law May Be Revised, BOSTON SUN. HERALD, Jan. 3,
1965, § 1, at 80 (noting that "[iut is more difficult for [Southern and Eastern Europeans,
Africans and Asians] to immigrate to the U.S. Most attempts at revising the law would
alter this balance."); William Moore, Senators Cite Heritage, Plea for Alien Bill, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 21, 1965, § 1B, at 8 ("Supporters of repeal say that African and Asian coun-
tries need more immigration permits."); Cabell Phillips, Congress Seen Approving New
Immigration Law, BOSTON HERALD, May 23, 1965, § 1, at 25 ("Critics have long argued
that [the National Origins Quota System] tended to favor the Western European coun-
tries at the expense of other regions, particularly the Far East."); Irene Saint, How
Immigration Bill Would Affect Boston Area, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 17, 1965, § 4, at 1
(noting that Asian countries; among others, would benefit from reform).
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were foolish."'
3. Sources of the New Immigration: Families and Professionals
The few estimates which were offered support the idea that an
increase in Asian immigration was expected. Administration officials
predicted that Asian immigrants would account for 94,972 of the
820,910 immigrants expected during the five-year phase-out of the
quota system that was proposed by President Kennedy;'95 this was an
increase over the 15,000 or so who came in each year during the
1950s, but, because of increasing numbers in the late 1950s and 1961-
65, about the same proportion as had come in under McCarran-
Walter.'96
Senator Fong predicted that about twenty percent of quota spots
would go to the Asia-Pacific triangle once the new law was in full ef-
fectt----more than a 300% increase over their share in the 1950s, and
over 1300% more than their official quota of 2,000 (1.53% of all vi-
sas) under McCarran-Walter. Concretely, twenty percent of the
170,000 per year Eastern Hemisphere quota under the new law would
be 34,000 for Asia (not counting non-quota immigration).
If hard estimates are scarce, impressionistic information is more
plentiful. The 1965 law offered preferences to skilled immigrants and
to family members of United States citizens or permanent resident
aliens. The legislative record indicates that Congress understood that
Asians would take advantage of both aspects of the new law.
a. Asian Family Reunification
Congress perceived clearly the problem of divided families-
Americans separated from family members eligible to immigrate ex-
cept for their race. Many immigrants, Massachusetts Senator
Saltonstall explained, "have spouses, children, parents, brothers or
sisters still abroad whom they wish to bring to this country to join
them."'98 Legislators recognized that this problem applied with spe-
194. See Deane Heller & David Heller, Our New Immigration Law, AM. LEGION
MAG., Feb. 1966, at 6, 9. This and other misinterpretations of the law, according to the
authors, were "a bit of faking" on the part of the press. Id. at 41.
195. See Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 589.
196. See 1991 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 6, at 29. Although Asian coun-
tries had no quotas or small quotas during this period, many Asians immigrated
nevertheless, through special bills for refugees, relatives, scientists and the like. See infra
notes 288-96 and accompanying text.
197. See Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 118,147.
198. 111 CONG. REC. 24,441 (1965). Although there were family reunification prefer-
ences under McCarran-Walter for low-quota countries, they were rapidly exhausted.
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cial force to Asians. The experience of passing many private bills, 9'
necessary to reunite families or alleviate other severe hardships, was
not forgotten in the debate on the 1965 law. Robert Kennedy, for
example, testified as Attorney General about the problems Ameri-
cans had bringing in an immediate relative who was "Italian or
Australian, Spanish or Portuguese, Japanese or Korean, Indian or
Filipino."2 Senator Neuberger explained that
we on the west coast have a large number of citizens who
are second, third, and fourth generation Americans, but
whose ancestors were born in China, Japan, Korea, other
Asiatic countries-the Philippines-in order to reunite
some of these families requires my putting in a number of
private bills every year."
Congress recognized that the volume of Asian family reunifica-
tion immigration would be significant. For example, Representative
John Lindsay noted that in 1964, "[t]he great majority of the immi-
grants who entered the country over and above their national quotas
were admitted because they were the wives, husbands, or children of
U.S. citizens. Persons in any one of these three categories last year
alone accounted for ... almost 8,000 from Asia."' ' As a result, non-
quota family reunification immigration from Asia was nearly four
times quota immigration. 3 That these facts were before Congress
when it passed the bill suggests that when they continued to be true,
it was no surprise.
199. A look though the private bills section of a volume of Statutes at Large suggests
the magnitude of the private bill solution. See, e.g., An Act for the Relief of Thelma Mar-
garet Hwang, Priv. L. No. 85-94,71 Stat. A39 (1957); An Act for the Relief of Kuo York
Chynn, Priv. L. No. 85-96, 71 Stat. A39 (1957); An Act for the Relief of Yun Wha Yoon
Holsman, Priv. L. No. 85-97, 71 Stat. A39 (1957); An Act for the Relief of Chong You
How, Priv. L. No. 85-102,71 Stat. A41 (1957).
200. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 216. He repeated this comment as New
York's junior senator. See 111 CONG. REC. 24,482 (1965).
201. .Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 548.
202. Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra note 93, at 413. Many other members of Congress
made the same point. Representative James Roosevelt wrote that an American citizen of
Indian ancestry would have difficulty bringing in a brother or sister, while a British neigh-
bor would find it easy. See Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 320. Representative
Thomas Gill of Hawaii, stated: "Reuniting families, particularly when you deal with the
various Chinese quotas and the Asian [sic] Pacific triangle quota, is very important to
Hawaii." Id. at 179; see also id. at 305 (statement of Rep. Joseph Minish) (noting that a
Chinese constituent was unable to bring in her sister from Hong Kong); cf. id. at 697
(statement by a member of a social welfare agency that the wife and child of an American
physician could not enter).
203. Representative Byron Rogers also spoke about family immigration pulling in
large groups, see Hearings on H. 7700, supra note 38, at 78, and he later mentioned
Indian or Italian family members. See id. at 83.
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b. Asian Professionals
The record also shows that Congress was well aware that signifi-
cant numbers of Asian professionals would immigrate once they had
a chance. One after another, legislators regaled each other with sto-
ries about real or hypothetical Asian professionals who could not be
admitted because of their racial ancestry.2 These stories were only
anecdotes, but it was clear that the number of Asian professionals
who would immigrate was thought to be significant. Indeed, Repre-
sentative Arch Moore, a supporter of the bill, was concerned about
the brain drain from Asia:
204. Senator Allott spoke of a Chinese nurse who faced deportation. See 111 CONG.
REC. 24,473 (1965). Senator Clark noted that a "brilliant Korean or Indian scientist is
turned away, while the northern European is accepted almost without question.... While
Plato and Dante would have a hard time getting into the United States ... Confucius or
Lao-tze could not get in at all." Id. at 24,501. Senator Robert Kennedy mentioned three
professionals who could not get in because of the quota system: a Greek chemist, a Ko-
rean radiation specialist and a Japanese microbiologist. See id. at 24,482. Representative
Thomas Gill spoke of a doctor of Chinese descent, who, he thought, was a native to the
Philippines, who could not get into Hawaii. See Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at
180. Senator Paul Douglas explained that a Chinese engineer in Evanston, Illinois, was
unable to obtain permanent residency for his Chinese wife, a nurse, who had entered on a
student visa. See Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 153. According to Senator
Neuberger, a cancer expert sought by a medical school was kept out because of the Asia
Pacific triangle rule. See id. at 550-51. A representative of the ACLU stated that a hypo-
thetical "brilliant physicist living in Hong Kong who is Chinese," id. at 450, would not be
able to come in. Attorney General Katzenbach testified that there were "innumerable"
cases in which the quota system damaged the United States by keeping out professionals,
including a "brilliant" Indian cardiac surgeon. See id. at 10. He also observed that an
Indian brain surgeon would likely be excluded or subjected to a very long wait, but a
common laborer from Ireland could easily enter. See Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra note
93, at 17. Attorney General Robert Kennedy said skilled workers from the United States
would go to "Italy, Germany, England, and Japan," just as we took their skilled workers.
Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 427. Similarly, after Senator Kennedy noted that
the Asia Pacific triangle restrictions would be eliminated by the bill, Maryland Senator
Tydings noted that his family doctor was Chinese, that his son had a close Korean friend,
and exclaimed with apparent passion:
Why if a man can make a great contribution-a doctor, a writer, a scientist, or a
scholar-the fact ... that he should be kept out, when we arbitrarily bring any-
body in from northern Europe whether they can make a contribution or not,
merely because the quota of northern Europe is not filled, just does not make
sense.
Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 657. John Lindsay explained: "A high proportion of
those who most want to come to America and who would be of most benefit to us are
ineligible. A very few countries are given high quotas which they don't use. Other coun-
tries with vastly larger populations ... are given tiny quotas." Hearings on H.R. 7700,
supra note 38, at 115. Senator Fong also advised the Senate Judiciary Committee of No-
bel prize winning scientists who had managed to make it in, including a number of Asians.
See Hearings on S. 1932, supra note 121, at 98 (listing immigrants from Europe and Asia
who have won Nobel prizes).
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In the Asia-Pacific triangle countries, there isn't a very
wholesome attitude about us from the standpoint of our
immigration policies; and yet, here we become a scavenger
for brain power in the same part of the world. It just seems
to me that while we may in a very logical way, by removing
the national origins system, remove the stigma of placing a
greater value on one citizen over another, we jump right
back into the fire in another respect when we set up these
magnets to pull out their choicest citizens.'
Similarly, Labor Secretary Wirtz suggested that the quality of
skilled immigration would increase because Asian immigration would
open up. After discussing the small quotas available to the Asia-
Pacific triangle countries, Wirtz said, "under the new bill there will be
situations in which a more skilled person will come in where under
the old bill a less skilled person from a country whose quota was not
filled would have come in.,M6
There was also evidence that once opportunities to immigrate
were made available, Asians would take full advantage of them. In
September of 1966, before the law was fully implemented,M and
therefore before its consequences could be fully known, British
economist Brinley Thomas predicted that Asian immigration would
increase.2'8 His argument was based not only on logic, but on the re-
sults of 1962 legislation,29 which made it easier for professionals to
205. Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra note 93, at 223. A critic writing in The New Repub-
lic argued that the law would "suck in the doctors and engineers that underdeveloped
countries need at home." T.R.B. from Washington, Who Should Enter?, THE NEW
REPUBLC, Feb. 20, 1965, at 4, 4. Clearly, this was a reference to underdeveloped third
world nations, not Germany or England. See also Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra note 93,
at 374 (statement of W.B. Hicks, of the Liberty Lobby) ("Should we deprive the underde-
veloped nations of the world of the cream of their limited supply of doctors, engineers,
and teachers by making these skills the No. 1 preference in our immigration law, and at
the same time, spend millions on programs designed to develop such skills in those na-
tions?"); 111 CONG. REC. 21,775 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Durward Hall).
206. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 114.
207. Under the law, the national origins quota system was not fully abolished until
1968. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 1,
79 Stat. 911, 911 (providing that each country would have at least the same quota as it had
under McCarran-Walter until June 30, 1968, but unused quota slots would be used for
oversubscribed countries).
208. See Brinley Thomas, From the Other Side: A European View, 367 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 63,68 (1966).
209. Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, 76 Stat. 1247. Technically, the bill al-
lowed entry over and above the quota of certain immigrants who, by virtue of their skills,
were entitled to first preference entry under McCarran-Walter, but whose countries' quo-
tas were exhausted. See S. REP. No. 87-2276, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4204
(reporting favorably on S. 336, describing in particular its effect on worthy Chinese who
wished to immigrate).
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enter the United States.
The 1962 statute allowed "large numbers of alien scientists and
engineers to achieve immigrant status within a relatively short period
of time., 2'0 As a result, immigration of European scientists and engi-
neers increased twenty-three percent, but "that of Asians increased
by no less than 182 per cent. This indicates that skilled Asian immi--
gration has a remarkably high elasticity with respect to a moderate
liberalizing of the restrictions."1 ' The author concluded:
If the relatively minor supplement to the law in October
1962 led to an almost threefold increase in the influx of
highly qualified Asians, one wonders what the basic altera-
tion in the principles of selection enacted in 1965 is likely to
do. One can only sunnise that the process of creaming oJ[
skills from the poorest areas of the world will be intensified.'
Members of Congress working on the 1965 bill were aware of the
prior law and its effects.' In short, rather than concluding that im-
migration of Asian professionals should have been no surprise; it
seems more probable that it was no surprise to any member of Con-.
gress who listened to the testimony and debates on the bill.
D. The Evidence Supporting a Prediction of No Asian Influx
There is some evidence that members of Congress and other in-
formed sources doubted that Asian immigration would increase as a
result of the bill. Some of it is ambiguous.2 4 Even the most compel-
ling, however, does not outweigh the evidence to the contrary.
1. Attorney General Robert Kennedy's Prediction
The 1964 prediction by then-Attorney General Robert Kennedy,
cited at the beginning of this Article, is the centerpiece of the wide-
spread belief that no one expected an Asian influx as a result of
210. Thomas, supra note 208, at 67.
211. Id. at 67-68.
212. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
213. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1932, supra note 121, at 13 (testimony of Senator Philip
Hart) (noting the immigration "has not, in fact, flowed in the national origins channels set
forth in the 1952 Act"); 111 CONG. REC. 24,226 (1965) (chart including all admissions
under special legislation, including this act, described as the "act of Oct. 24,1962").
214. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 563 (testimony of Sen. Claiborne
Pell) ("Maybe there will be a huge surge from India or a huge surge from Africa, but I
would tend to doubt it."). Senator Strom Thurmond, who voted against the bill, stated
that he did not "believe that the immigration formula in the proposal now before the Sen-
ate, if properly administered, will result in drastic or undesirable changes in the patterns
of immigration into the United States." 111 CONG. REC. 24,237 (1965).
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immigration reform. According to Fortune, for example, "Attorney
General Robert Kennedy told the Senate that 5,000 Asian immi-
grants might come the first year, 'after which immigration from that
source would virtually disappear.' ,215 The interpretation that Robert
Kennedy's words constituted a projection that Asian immigration
would quickly become a thing of the past has been cited in the halls
of Congress,"6 by academics including Bill Ong g,. David Reim-
ers,21' Roger Daniels,21 9 Peter Schuck,' Nathan Glazer,"' Vernon
Briggs,m Nicolaus Mills,m and Michael Teitelbaum;' 4 published in
respected news outlets like the Economistm The San Francisco
Chronicle, The Los Angeles Times, The Christian Science Moni-
215. Scott McConnell, The New Battle Over Immigration, FORTUNE, May 9, 1988, at
89, 94.
216. See, e.g., Legal Immigration Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Claims of the House Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 134 (1995), available
in 1995 WL 306792 (testimony of Mark Krikorian, of the Center for Immigration Studies)
(citing Robert Kennedy's testimony); 132 CONG. REc. 27,397 (1986) (statement of Rep.
Donnelley, quoting Robert Kennedy's prediction).
217. See HING, supra note 30, at 39-40.
218. See DAVID M. REIMERS, STILL THE GOLDEN DOOR 77 (1st ed. 1985); Reimers,
supra note 122, at 9, 16. But see infra note 245 and accompanying text (discussing Profes-
sor Reimers's current view about the meaning of Robert Kennedy's comment).
219. See DANIELS, supra note 12, at 341 ("Members of [Johnson's] administration,
almost certainly in good faith, had testified before Congress that few Asians would come
in under the new law....").
220. See Schuck, supra note 122, at 7.
221. See Glazer, supra note 112, at 7.
222. See BRIGGS & MOORE, supra note 126, at 19 ("[I]t was anticipated that passage
of the Immigration Act of 1965 would lead to a decline in Asian immigration." (citing
Attorney General Robert Kennedy's testimony)).
223. See Nicolaus Mills, Introduction: The Era of the Golden Venture, in ARGUING
IMMIGRATION 1, 17 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994).
224. See Michael S. Teitelbaum, Skeptical Noises About the Immigration Multiplier, 23
INT'L MIGRATION REV. 893,895 (1989).
225. See Yes, They'll Fit In Too, THE ECONOMIST, May 11, 1991, at 17 (The 1965 re-
form "has had large, and largely unintended, consequences. Robert Kennedy, the then
attorney-general, was wildly wrong when he told a congressional committee that 5,000
immigrants might come from Asia in the first year 'but we do not expect that there would
be any great influx after that.' ").
226. See Ramon G. McLeod, A Call for an Immigration Policy, S.F. CHRON., July 4,
1991, at Al, A6:
In 1964, the late Robert Kennedy told a congressional hearing that an immigra-
tion law ending quota systems would result in at most about 5,000 people
immigrating from Asia. Almost 4 million Asians immigrated after the law went
into effect in 1965. Such unanticipated results ... have been the hallmark of re-
cent immigration debate.
Id.; see Ramon G. McLeod, 1965 Immigration Reform Law Opened Door for Asians, S.F.
CHRON., July 4, 1988, at A5 (describing the contrast between the prediction and the large
increase in immigration in the Bay Area).
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tor, m The Baltimore Evening Sunn2 The Phoenix Gazette,' and Fi-
nancial Worldn l and used as ammunition by anti-immigration
activists like Lawrence Auster, 2 Leon Bouvier,23 Peter Brimelow
and Otis Graham.s The perceived meaning is completely wrong,
making it possibly the most pervasive legend in immigration history.
Even under McCarran-Walter, Asian immigration in 1964 was
21,279,'6 and had averaged 15,000 per year in the 1950s. 7 Is it possi-
ble that Robert Kennedy thought that Asian immigration would
"virtually disappear" after 1966; that he believed eliminating restric-
tions would diminish immigration?"s This interpretation makes no
sense. Close examination of the hearing record where the statement
was made shows why his testimony was misunderstood.
Attorney General Kennedy was testifying about the administra-
tion version of the bill, which continued the historical practice of
imposing no numerical limitation on Western Hemisphere immigra-
tion. The bill, however, would, for the first time, extend the privilege
of unlimited Western Hemisphere immigration to persons of Asian
227. See Douglas Massey, Immigration Adjustments Ignore the Chain Effect of Family
Eligibility, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1988, pt. 2, at 7 (Op-Ed column by a sociology professor at
the University of Chicago) (citing Kennedy quote as example of unpredictability of immi-
gration law changes).
228. See John Dillin, Asian Americans: Soaring Minority, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Oct. 10, 1985, at 3 ("Seldom has any public official been so wrong.").
229. See Seebach, supra note 14, at 9A (editorial commentary by a California newspa-
per editor).
230. John Kolbe, "Alien Nation:" Immigration Alters Face of America Against its Will,
PHOENIX GAZETTE, Oct. 13,1995, at B5.
231. See Kermit Lansner, Who Will Be an American?, FINANCIAL WORLD, Apr. 17,
1990, at 100.
232. See AUSTER, supra note 14, at 20-23 (describing Kennedy's approach as
"divorce[d] from reality").
233. See LEONF. BOUVIER & LINDSEY GRANT, How MANY AMERICANS? 79 (1994)
(dealing with the environmental impact of immigration). Mr. Bouvier is also concerned
about the racial makeup of the nation. See LEON F. BOUVIER & CAREY B. DAVIS,
IMMIGRATION AND THE FUTURE RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES 7-19
(1982). For a critique of the environmental argument against immigration, see Peter L.
Reich, Environmental Metaphor in the Alien Benefits Debate, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1577
passim (1995).
234. See, e.g., BRIMELOW, supra note 13, at 78 (quoting and mocking Kennedy's pur-
ported prediction).
235. See Graham, supra note 9, at 19 ("Attorney General Robert Kennedy predicted
5,000 immigrants from the entire Asia-Pacific Triangle, 'after which immigration from
that source would virtually disappear.' ").
236. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 6, at 109.
237. See 1991 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 6, at 49.
238. Query what bizarre phenomenon would make 5,000 Asians want to immigrate in
1965, but none thereafter?
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ancestry who lived in the region.29 The question was:
Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Attorney General, what influx or in-
crease in nonquota immigrants would you consider likely by
the abolition of the Asia-Pacific triangle and the relation-
ship of the same upon the nonquota immigration from the
Western Hemisphere?
Attorney General KENNEDY. I would say for the Asia-
Pacific triangle it would be approximately 5,000, Mr. Chair-
man, after which immigration from that source would
virtually disappear; 5,000 immigrants could come in the first
year, but we do not expect that there would be any great in-
flux after that. 0
Kennedy was asked to comment on the increase in Asian immi-
gration from the Western Hemisphere which would result from
extending nonqifota immigration privileges to them. Kennedy re-
plied that 5,000 Asians would immigrate from the Western
Hemisphere as a result of the change, not that 5,000 Asians would
immigrate from all the countries of the world. To the contrary, dur-
ing the same hearing,241 Robert Kennedy filed written projections
estimating that 94,972 Asians-not 5,000-would immigrate in the
first five years of the proposed law.12 Testimony by Secretary of
State Dean Rusk243 and Justice Department officials makes clear that
Kennedy was predicting that 5,000 Asians living in the Western
Hemisphere would immigrate when they were eligible to do so, not
that 5,000 Asians worldwide would come to the United States.2" A
239. Recall that under McCarran-Walter, in effect when Kennedy was testifying, per-
sons of Asian descent, wherever born, were relegated to the tiny quotas of their countries
of racial ancestry. See supra notes 70-71.
240. Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 418.
241. See id. at 431 (statement of Rep. Poff) (referring to "[t]he document which the
Attorney General presented for inclusion in the record").
242. See id. at 589.
243. See id. at 406 (testimony of Dean Rusk) ("The elimination of the Asia-Pacific
triangle would result in an estimated 5,000 or 6,000 persons annually entering the United
States from nonquota areas, who are now chargeable to highly oversubscribed quota areas
within the Asia-Pacific triangle." (emphasis added)).
244. Assistant Attorney General Schlei, for example, was asked about the repeal of
the Asia-Pacific triangle quota and its effects on non-quota immigration. He replied:
I understand it is estimated, about 5,000 people who would like to come to the
United States and are in either nonquota areas [i.e., the Western Hemisphere],
or in areas where there are no waiting lists, such as England, Ireland, and Ger-
many, but are now unable to come because they had Asiatic ancestors. We
would, therefore, get 5,000 immigrants within the first year from that source, but
from then on it would disappear.
Id. at 482 (emphasis added); see also id. (testimony of Office of Legal Counsel attorney
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few people got it right, including David Reimers in his more recent
work,245 but the myth persists. The best evidence that the framers of
the 1965 Act believed it would not increase Asian immigration turns
out to be a misunderstanding.
2. Focus on Southern and Eastern Europe and Backlogs on Wait-
Lists
When it considered the law, Congress may well have been fo-
cusing on remedying injustices to southern and eastern Europeans.' 6
Several commentators have relied on this point as partial support for
the idea that the increase in Asian immigration was unforeseen.247
Perhaps the possibility of significant Asian immigration was just
overlooked, but this is implausible. Leaving aside the many affirma-
tive statements that Asian immigration would increase, remarks by
members of Congress noting the injustices to would-be Asian immi-
grants seem to suggest that Asians were not ignored by the people
who were considering the law.2m
Under McCarran-Walter, when a visa was not available, an alien
could be placed on a waiting list and thus become part of a country's
"backlog." Some have pointed to the fact that the largest waiting
lists for visas were in Italy and Greece at the time the bill was
passed.249 The relatively smaller backlogs in China, say, might have
indicated a lower demand for immigration, and hence supported the
conclusion that not many Asians would want to immigrate after the
reforms. But this analysis ignores the issue of relative quotas; a
backlog of 50,000 is not daunting if a nation's quota is 25,000 per
year; a backlog of 5,000 might be insuperable for a would-be immi-
grant from a nation with a quota of one hundred. The real question
Adam Walinsky) (noting that 5,000 Asians would come as a result of the change).
245. See REIMERS, supra note 10, at 74-76. Credit goes to Dr. Stephen Wagner for
being the first scholar to identify this misunderstanding in his dissertation. See Wagner,
supra note 122, at 470-71 n.21.
246. See Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 215 (remarks of Rep. John Murphy)
(focusing on Italian, Greek and Polish immigrants); id. at 219 (remarks of Rep. William
Ryan); id. at 274 (remarks of Rep. James J. Delaney); id. at 300 (remarks of Rep. Roland
Libonati).
247. See DANIELS, supra note 12, at 341; HING, supra note 30, at 39-40; YANG, supra
note 122, at 21.
248. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1932, supra note 121, at 10-11 (testimony of Sen. Philip
Hart) ("Let us restore equality and fair play in our selecting immigrants. Discriminatory
provisions against immigrants from eastern and southern Europe, token quotas for Asian
and African countries, and implications of race superiority in the Asia-Pacific Triangle
concept have no place in the public policy of the United States.").
249. See, e.g., REIMERS, supra note 10, at 76, 92-93; Reimers, supra note 122, at 16.
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is not the backlog in absolute terms, but the length of the wait for a
visa. This point did not escape members of Congress; among many
others,' 0 Senator Saltonstall pointed out that over 40,000 people were
on the wait list for the Chinese quota,"' which made the wait over 380
years for a visa, given China's annual quota of 105. That Chinese
would put their names on a list, even though, as Senator Fong noted,
the quota was "for all practical purposes exhausted in perpetuity, 2
indicates a desire to immigrate to the United States of almost relig-
ious intensity.
3. Structural Protections Against Asian Immigration
Arguably, supporters of the bill might have expected little in-
crease in Asian immigration because, as in 1943 and 1952, protections
against unlimited immigration were built into the statute23 To the
extent that this argument suggests that there would be some upper
limit on immigration, it is, of course, correct. If it suggests that the
limits would ensure low proportions of Asian immigration, it is im-
plausible because the structure of the 1965 law was so different from
previous statutes that there was no reasonable basis for predicting
that it would prevent "overrepresentation" from particular regions of
the world.
One important restriction in the 1965 law was the 20,000 per
country annual limitation, which was designed to avoid "opening up
the gates to a vast flood from some particular country." There are
hints in the legislative history that the "particular countries" Con-
gress was concerned with were Asian. Representative Feighan, for
example, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee's subcommit-
tee with jurisdiction over immigration, stated that repeal of the Asia-
Pacific triangle concept "has met with strong reactions from our allies
and friends in Asia who have come to regard it as the same kind of
personal affront as the old Chinese Exclusion Act."' 5 In the next
breath, he added that "the proposed selective system of immigrant
admissions included in the bill guarantees that no country can receive
a disproportionate number of the total visas authorized." 6 The fact
250. See supra note 171 (listing several other people who were concerned about the
substantial backlogs in visa waiting lists).
251.' See 111 CONG. REc. 24,441 (1965).
252. Id. at 24,447.
253. See, e.g., REVMERS, supra note 10, at 74-75.
254. 111 CONG. REC. 24,763 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen).
255. Id at 21,585.
256. Id.
[Vol. 75
CIVIL RIGHTS AND IMMIGRATION
that he thought of the per-country limitation might be read to suggest
some connection between disproportionate immigration, on the one
hand, and Asians on the other. Similarly, Representative Giaimo
noted that the bill would repeal the Asia-Pacific triangle provisions,
but added in the next sentence that "lilt is important to note that this
new law will not open the floodgates of immigration as charged by
opponents of the bill." z
There is countervailing evidence suggesting that the 20,000 cap
was not created with Asians in mind."5 However, even if the 20,000
per country annual limitation was intended to restrict Asian immigra-
tion, compared to prior restrictive laws-limiting Chineseimmigration to 105, as the 1943 act had done, or all Asian immigra-
tion to 2,000-a maximum of 20,000 per country could be called an
open door policy as easily as a restriction. Representative Moore,
explaining that Asians would be treated the same as persons from
other parts of the world, showed the arithmetic:
It does not mean that that number, 20,000, of Chinese,
Japanese; or Filipinos are immediately going to come into this
country, but the upper limitation [of the number] to which
they would be entitled would be that number .... People who
attack what we are doing here today say that it will let millions
of orientals come into the United States. I wanted to place in
the RECORD the observation that there is no one in this
House who need fear such an event occurring. "
Moore was right; millions of Asians would not enter each year.
But Moore recognized the possibility that just three Asian countries
could send 60,000 per year, thirty times as many as all Asians world-
wide had been officially allowed under McCarran-Walter. This was a
revolutionary increase compared to past treatment of Asian immigra-
tion.
Another potential safeguard was a Western Hemisphere quota
limitation.m Representative Fisher, echoing arguments from the
257. I& at 21,767.
258. See Telephone Interview with Norbert Schlei, supra note 157 (explaining that the
per-country limit was imposed because of southern and eastern European nations).
259. 111 CONG. REC. 21,590-91 (1965). Representative Thomas Pelly, who asked the
question which engendered that response, stated that
I would like to say to the gentleman that I would not fear that amount of those
persons coming in. I have a great amount of Japanese, Chinese, and Filipinos in
my district. It is not that I register fear that they might come in because they
make wonderful citizens. I want to make that clear.
Id. at 21,591.
260. The restriction was not in the House bill reported by the Judiciary Committee
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1943 and 1952 debates, argued that "there are about half a million
Chinese living in the Western Hemisphere, many of whom would like
to come into this country if they could, but who are prohibited now
from doing so because of the triangle provision. '"' The law pro-
tected against this eventuality by imposing, for the first time, a
120,000 annual limit on Western Hemisphere immigration. But this
restriction also was insignificant compared to those which were
eliminated.
4. Did a Mistake Regarding Non-Quota Immigration Contribute to
the Passage of the Bill?
There was a very odd episode on the floor of the Senate immedi-
ately before the bill was passed. In an exchange on the floor of the
Senate, in the presence of floor manager Edward Kennedy, the
meaning of the bill was spectacularly misinterpreted in a way that
suggested there was an additional protection against changes in the
immigration stream.
Some senators may have voted for the 1965 law believing that a
provision allowing unlimited immigration of immediate family mem-
bers of citizens applied only to people who were citizens when the
law was passed, and not to persons who became citizens through birth
or naturalization after 1965. This was an important issue. If people
born or naturalized after 1965 were required to unify their families
through numerically limited quota immigration, then (leaving aside
emergency situations) the 1965 law would have been extremely pre-
dictable-only 290,000 visas would be available each year, and every
alien who wanted to come in would have to get one of them, or wait
until next year. If this interpretation had been correct, the chain mi-
gration phenomenon would have been significantly dampened.62
This feature actually was not part of the law; even people who be-
came citizens after 1965 could bring in their immediate relatives free
of the quota.
However, on the floor of the Senate, proponents did not explain
that non-quota, immediate relative immigration was a permanent
and was, in fact, narrowly rejected as a floor amendment. However, it was in the version
approved by the Senate, and was accepted by the Conference, thus becoming part of the
law. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, §§ 8(a),
21(e), 79 Stat. 911, 916, 921 (defining Western Hemisphere natives as "special immi-
grants" and limiting their numbers to 120,000 per year).
261. 111 CONG. REC. 21,774 (1965).
262. "Chain migration" or the "multiplier effect" is the phenomenon by which one
immigrant brings over other relatives, who, in turn, can sponsor their relatives. See
DANIELS, supra note 12, at 19.
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feature of the law which would permit anyone who became a citizen
in the future to bring their relatives to the United States. Instead,
non-quota immigration was characterized as a transitional "clean-up"
program, allowing people who were citizens on the date of the Act to
reunify their families by bringing in immediate relatives.
The issue was raised when Senator Holland, an opponent of the
bill, asked: "Is any distinction made between the members of fami-
lies of immigrants already in the United States and those who would
come in as new immigrants?"'  Edward Kennedy, misunderstanding
this somewhat ambiguous question, simply described the preference
system again, and Holland repeated the question: "Is there any dif-
ference between relatives of migrants who are already here, whether
citizens or not, and relatives of migrants who will be coming in under
the bill, as to their being charged or not charged to the quota?"'
Senator Ervin answered: "As I understand the bill, every person who
comes as an immigrant is charged to the limitation, except certain
relatives of one who is already here as an American citizen."' Sena-
tor Kennedy added: "That is exactly correct."" The ambiguity, of
course, was whether "already here" meant as of the effective date of
the bill, or at the time in the future when an alien relative sought toimmigrate.
Senator Holland apparently understood that the answer was that
only people who were already citizens in 1965 could bring in their
relatives free of quota limitations: "Then there is a difference in the
charging to the quota or not charging to the quota as between immi-
grants already in the United States seeking to bring their relatives in,
and those who seek to bring them in with them after the passage of
the law."'' 7 Senator Pastore, a supporter of the bill, agreed that peo-
ple who became citizens after 1965 could bring their relatives in only
subject to quota limitations:
[Senator Holland] is making a good point. His question
may be misunderstood. His question is this, as I understand:
If a person who comes to the United States let us say, in
1970, has relatives abroad, under what conditions may he
bring his relatives in? It is my understanding that under the
bill, whoever comes in 1970 will have to come in under the
overall number.... In other words, the exception is being
263. 111 CONG. REC. 24,775 (1965).
264. Id.
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made as to the people already in the United States; and at
the time of the signing of the bill there will be the authority,
the exemption, in order to provide for family unification.
But beyond that point, any relatives who come in new, so to
speak, will come in as immigrants and must be counted
among the number.m
Again, it was not true that "whoever comes in 1970 will have to
come in under the overall number." A person born in the United
States in 1966 who wanted to bring in her alien spouse in 1986 could
do so without respect to the 290,000 numerical limitation. Yet, no
member of the Senate contradicted Senator Pastore's interpretation
of the new law.29 While the Senate Judiciary Committee Report it-
self was fairly clear on the effect of the law,27 there is no guarantee
that the majority of the senators were aware of it.
The apparent misunderstanding is important, because Senator
Pastore, who offered the misinterpretation, voted for the bill. It is
conceivable that other supporters shared that mistaken view. Ac-
cordingly, it may be that, had an opponent understood the actual
workings of the provision sufficiently to chime in, even supporters of
the general concept of scrapping national origins might have voted to
change this provision.
If some version of the interpretation expressed on the Senate
floor actually had been in the law, then the Asian-American situation
would have been quite different. A significant share of their post-
1965 immigration has been pursuant to non-quota family reunifica-
tion."' Nevertheless, like the 20,000 annual limitation, and the
268. Id. (emphasis added).
269. Apparently, virtually the entire Senate was present for this exchange, because
Senator Holland was the third-to-last person to speak before Senator Edward Kennedy
called for a vote. See 111 CONG. REc. 24,779 (1965) (concluding remarks of Sen. Hol-
land); id. at 24,780 (Sen. Edward Kennedy calling for the vote).
270. See S. REP. No. 89-748, at 13 (1965), reprinted in TRELLES & BAILEY, supra note
38, doc. 73 ("In order that the family unit may be preserved as much as possible, parents
of adult U.S. citizens, as well as spouses and children, may enter the United States with-
out numerical limitation."). It would not make sense for the non-quota admission of
"immediate relatives" of citizens to have been a transitional program because there was
no preference category for such persons. Thus, if they did not continue to be non-quota
on an ongoing basis, then they could have entered only as non-preference immigrants. In
that event, for example, spouses of citizens would have a far worse immigration situation
than spouses of resident aliens.
271. Statistics from a few randomly chosen years illustrate the point. In 1975, 386,194
immigrants were admitted, including 132,469 Asians; 33,539 Asians were immediate rela-
tives of citizens, and 94,032 entered subject to numerical restrictions. See INS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1975 ANNUAL REPORT 36 tbl.6 (1976). In 1980, of 530,639 immi-
grants, 236,097 were from Asia; 112,552 Asians entered subject to numerical limitations,
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establishment of a Western Hemisphere quota, if this non-existent
feature had been thought of as a protection against Asian immigra-
tion, it would have been so loose that it must be regarded as a break
from the policies of prior statutes.
E. Celler, Masaoka, Rusk
The best evidence that members of the administration or Con-
gress thought there would be little Asian immigration are the public
statements of three knowledgeable participants, House Judiciary
Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler, Japanese American Citizens
League officer Mike Masaoka, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.2
Celler's oft-cited remarks suggest that he believed non-whiteimmigration would be limited:
Mr. Chairman, claim has been made that the bill would
bring in hordes of Africans and Asians. This is the answer
to that false charge: Persons from African and Asian coun-
tries would continue to come in as heretofore, but would be
treated like everyone else. With the end of discrimination
due to place of birth, there will be shifts to countries other
than those of northern and western Europe. Immigrants
from Asia and Africa will have to compete and qualify in
order to get in, quantitatively and qualitatively, which, itself,
will hold the numbers down. There will not be, compara-
tively, many Asians or Africans entering this country.
Mr. Chairman, since the peoples of Africa and Asia have
very few relatives here, comparatively few could immigrate
and 59,029 entered as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. See INS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE INS, 1980, at 18 tbl.7 (1981). In fiscal year
1986, of 601,708 immigrants, 258,546 were from Asia; 114,202 Asians entered subject to
numerical limitations, and 85,292 were immediate relatives of United States citizens. See
INS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE INS, 1986, at 18 tbl.8
(1987). In fiscal year 1990, 1,536,483 immigrants were admitted, including 338,581
Asians, of which 96,810 were immediate relatives of citizens. See 1991 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK, supra note 6, at 62 tbl.7.
These numbers almost certainly understate to some degree the total effect of non-
quota admission of immediate relatives. Even leaving aside the attraction effects of
larger Asian populations, some persons who enter the United States as immediate rela-
tives later bring in their relatives under a preference.
272. A number of commentators rely on Representative Celler's statements. See, e.g.,
BRIGGS & MOORE, supra note 126, at 17; TAKAKI, supra note 41, at 419; Reimers, supra
note 122, at 16. Professors Briggs and Reimers also rely on Mike Mfasaoka's statements,
as does Professor Daniels. See DANIELS, supra note 12, at 341; TAKAKI, supra note 41, at
419; Reimers, supra note 122, at 16. Lawrence Auster and Professor Reimers also rely on
Dean Rusk's testimony. See AUSTER, supra note 14, at 21; REmERS, supra note 10, at
75-76.
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from those countries, because they have no family ties in the
United States.... There is no danger whatsoever of an influx
from the countries of Asia and Africa.
Although Celler acknowledged that there would be shifts in the im-
migration stream, he also seemed to say that there would not be
"comparatively" many Asian or African immigrants; that is, that
there would be no huge influxes.
Mike Masaoka, longtime JACL officer and advocate of immigra-
tion reform, insisted that fears of a " 'flood' of immigration from the
Orient" were "groundless." 24 Because seventy-four percent of the
visas were designated for family reunification, the small numbers of
Asians here would not be able to take advantage of them, with the
result that "the general pattern of immigration which exists today will
continue for many years yet to come."'' Dean Rusk, likewise, com-
mented that "[a]ny increase in the volume of immigration resulting
from the proposed amendments would be rather limited against the
actual volume of Asian immigration into the United States between
1953 and 1963. " 276
One possible explanation for the remarks is that people were
simply stretching the truth to get a bill passed.2' If so, it does not
necessarily mean that others shared a concern that a truthful predic-
tion about an increase would be fatal to the bill. Celler and Masaoka
had been defeated in 1952-McCarran-Walter had been passed de-
spite racial restrictions they deeply opposed. Indeed, forty-one years
later, when Celler's views finally prevailed, he reminded his col-
leagues that he "inveighed against this national origins theory a way
back in 1924,"2" when Congress passed the first permanent quota law.
Even if the traditional fear of Asian immigration had diminished in
the minds of other legislators by 1965, it would be understandable if
Celler and Masaoka were still concerned with the "kiss of death" that
Senator McCarran had predicted would destroy any bill eliminating
273. 111 CONG. REC. 21,757-58 (1965) (emphasis added).
274. Id. at 24,503.
275. Id
276. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 48-49; accord Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra
note 93, at 90; Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 389. Similarly, although he be-
lieved that Asians would account for approximately 20% of Western Hemisphereimmigration, Senator Fong suggested the possibility that the Asian American population
might never exceed one percent of the total. See Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at
119.
277. As Adam Walinsky observed in this context, "people in debate say all Idnds of
things." See Telephone Interview with Adam Walinsky, supra note 157.
278. 111 CONG. REC. 21,579 (1965).
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special restrictions on Asian immigration.2" When Masaoka ob-
served that "the slant of my eyes ... ha[s] nothing to do with the slant
of my heart,"m he might have suspected that others would not
agree."l
Equally plausible is that these comments, taken in the context of
the entire history of the bill, were sincere, and have proved to be ac-
curate. What would constitute an "influx" or a "flood"? When
attempting to alleviate fears of Asian immigration from the Western
Hemisphere, Mike Masaoka argued that "[e]ven if all the million
[persons of Asian descent] from Latin America ... came in at one
279. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing Senator McCarran's predic-
tion). Former Assistant Attorney General Schlei believes this may be the explanation for
Celler's comments:
Mhe standard lore was that it was utterly impossible to change the national oi-
gins quota system because there was such an entrenched feeling in Congress and
in the country that everyone wanted the same racial, national make-up of the
immigrant stream, but when I began to promote that Bill and to talk to people
about it in the Congress, I found that it was not anywhere near as totally ac-
cepted a proposition as everybody had thought.... [A]lmost everybody felt bad
about our immigration laws and felt that something needed to be done about
it.... But Celler was a fellow who had struggled with immigration for a genera-
tion, and he I think, feared that if the word was around that this was going to
totally change the stream of immigration, the Bill might lose, so I think he tried
to develop arguments (and we probably helped him) to reassure those people
that if there was a change it certainly wouldn't be sudden .... I think Celler was
trying to think of every argument he could to reassure the conservative people
that what we were doing was not going to blow everything up like a bomb; it was
going to be a gradual change and not all that great.
Telephone Interview with Norbert Schlei, supra note 157.
280. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 626.
281. Perhaps it was no coincidence that Masaoka's comment came from a Japanese-
American, rather than an American of other Asian descent, because by 1965, the major
Japanese immigration to the United States was over. Compared to other Asian groups,
the influx of Japanese immigrants was small. See J. Wareing, The Changing Pattern of
Immigration into the United States, 1956-75, 63 GEOGRAPHY 220, 221 (1978) ("In Asia,
despite the spectacular rise in numbers, the trend was not universal and immigration from
Japan actually declined after 1965 because of the continuing buoyancy of the Japanese
economy and the competition for visas."). By the end of the 1970s, the first full decade of
the law's operation, Japanese-Americans fell from being the largest Asian subgroup to
the third largest, behind Chinese-Americans and Filipino-Americans. See DANIELS, su-
pra note 52, at 321-22; see also HING, supra note 30, at 106 ("A variety of factors have
combined to limit the impact of the 1965 Amendments on Japanese America."). This
phenomenon was predicted before the 1965 bill became law. See Hearings on H.R. 7700,
supra note 38, at 725 (statement of James Carey, President of the International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers) (noting the economic boom in Japan and predicting that
"very few Japanese would become emigrants [sicl to the United States today even if all
bars were down"). But cf Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 727 (testimony of Chi-
nese-American leader Jack Wong Sing) (stating, much more ambiguously, "[liet it not be
said that Chinese immigration would be opened"); see also Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra
note 38, at 846 (asserting that any increase would be limited).
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time... they still would not equal the number of Asiatics in this
country. And the total number of Asiatics in this country is less than
one-half of one percent." m A million in one day from one region of
the world would not be a huge influx. Similarly, Robert Kennedy
argued that an increase of two percent in the Italian-American pro-
portion of the total United States population over a course of years
would not constitute an alteration of the ethnic makeup of the coun-
try.' What seem to be very large shifts in absolute terms, we are
told, are de minimis; what to one person might seem like a flood, to
another is merely diversity.
Edward Kennedy explained that the bill "will not inundate
America with immigrants from any one country or area, or the most
populated and economically deprived nations of Africa and Asia....
[N]o country can be given more than 10 percent of the total annual
quota...."2 The protection was that no country could have more
than ten percent, but that did not preclude, say, China, Korea, India
and the Philippines, from having forty percent. Thus, when he ad-
vised that "[t]he principal beneficiaries of the new system are those
countries which have large backlogs of applicants for immigration,
but have relatively small quotas," that is, countries with high immi-
gration demand, he named China and Japan as two of the nine
countries which had the most to gain.' The result was not that there
would be no change in the immigration stream, but that "the ethnic
pattern of immigration under the proposed measure is not expected
to change as sharply as the critics seem to think."' Indeed, the bill
provided for a phasing out of the National Origins Quota System,
designed to make sure that the traditional sources of immigration
were protected for three years.' The clear implication of this provi-
sion is that after 1968, sources of immigration could change more
rapidly.
In these terms-a million in a day is not a huge influx, a two per-
cent increase over a period of decades is not a huge influx,
acceptance of a sharp (if not too sharp) change in the immigrant
stream-there still has not been an influx of Asian immigrants.
282. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 627; accord Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra
note 38, at 890-91.
283. See Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 217.
284. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
285. Id.
286. Id. (emphasis added).
287. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,
§ 1, 79 Stat. 911,911; see also supra note 207 (discussing this provision).
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Compared to the population of Asia as a proportion of the world
population, the percentage of Asians in the immigrant stream does
not represent a huge influx. Compared to the population of the
United States, the percentage of Asians in the immigrant stream does
not represent a huge influx. In absolute terms, the United States is a
long way from becoming a distinctly Asian country.
In addition, Celler, Masaoka and Rusk knew what is sometimes
obscured today: By 1965, McCarran-Walter had failed to maintain
an immigrant stream which reflected America's racial makeup as of
1952 or 1924; in particular, it had failed to limit the number of Asian
immigrants. A series of special laws admitted refugees m relatives,
and others,22 in response to particular political and economic exigen-
cies, even though no quota numbers were available for them.29' As
Richard Poff, a member of the House Judiciary Committee Sub-
committee Number One in 1964, explained:
[McCarran-Walter's] purpose has been called worthy and
unworthy. Whether the concept is sound or unsound, the
purpose worthy or unworthy, debate is no longer relevant.
The question is moot. The purpose has not been achieved.
The national origins system has not maintained the ethnic
ratios of the American population which prevailed in
1920.... For the last 3 years, for every immigrant entering
under the quota system, there were two entering by other
means, entirely within the law as amended by Congress
from time to time.2 2
Thus, under McCarran-Walter, that is, from 1953-1965, there
were roughly 28,000 quota numbers allotted to Asia,293 but 238,507
288. See, e.g., Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 1971 (a)-(q)) (omitted in current 50 U.S.C. app. due to provision that statute would
lapse on Dec. 31, 1956).
289. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 22, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-363, §4, 73 Stat. 644,644 (providing
for relief of backlog by admitting, as non-quota immigrants, certain relatives on waiting
lists) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994)).
290. See Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, § 2, 76 Stat. 1247, 1247 (admitting
certain skilled immigrants from waiting lists as non-quota immigrants).
291. See generally Helen F. Eckerson, Immigration and National Origins, 367 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SoC. Sci. 4, 10-14 (1966) (discussing laws providing for admissions
outside the quota system established by McCarran-Walter).
292. 111 CONG. REC. 21,772 (1965); see also H.R. REP. No. 89-745, at 11 (1965)
(making similar observation). As one member of Congress put it, "[t]he basic inequities
in the existing quota system have impelled Congress to enact numerous laws during the
past dozen years to meet emergency conditions." 111 CoNG. REC. 23,677 (1965)
(remarks of Rep. Cunningham).
293. See Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 308-25 (listing quotas for all nations).
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Asian immigrants. 2 4 Representative Moore noted that between 1953
and 1963, 119,677 immigrants came to the United States from China,
Japan and the Philippines, and 109,000 were non-quota immigrants. 95
Senator Hart informed the Senate Judiciary Committee that while
China had a quota of 1000 for the period 1953-1962, actual entrants
were 3,600 more; in spite of Japan's annual quota of 185, 48,169 im-
migrants arrived.296 A "limited" increase over a quota of 2000 is one
thing; a "limited" increase from a situation where Asians are already
coming in at a rate geometrically in excess of their quota, the situa-
tion Celler, Masaoka and Rusk were discussing, is another.
F. Was the Issue Left Vague Because Congressional Anti-Racism
Was Sincere?
Perhaps the best evidence of the attitude of Congress in 1965 is
what they did not say or do. In the committees and on the floor of
Congress, some people said Asian immigration would increase a little
or a lot, and others suggested those concerns were overblown. The
only formal estimates covered the transition period, not the much
more important time during which the law would be in full effect. If
ethnic changes in the immigrant stream were an important considera-
tion to the members of Congress who were neither extreme anti-
racists nor racists,2' why did they not insist on some kind of projec-
tions, or structural protections in the law against that eventuality? 21
294. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 6, at 108 (giving annual admissions sta-
tistics).
295. See 111 CONG. REC. 21,590 (1965). In 1931-40, 3.1% of the 528,000 immigrants
were from Asia; 3.5% of the approximately 1,000,000 immigrants admitted between 1941-
50 were from Asia; in 1951-60, of 2,515,000 immigrants, 6% were from Asia. See 1991
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 6, at 29. Thus, in absolute and proportionate terms,
Asian immigration had been increasing substantially for decades.
296. See Hearings on S. 1932, supra note 121, at 13.
297. Sitting in the first session of the 89th Congress were many who had opposed the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 because of its fundamental principle, and signed the Southern
Manifesto. For example, Senators James 0. Eastland, Allen Ellender, Sam Ervin, Spes-
sard Holland, John McClellan and Strom Thurmond voted against both the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, see 110 CONG. REC. 14,511 (1964), and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see
111 CONG. REC. 11,751-52 (1965); only Ervin switched sides and voted for the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965. See id. at 24,783. Each of these men-
and ninety or so other members of Congress-signed a statement entitled "Deviations
from the Fundamentals of the Constitution," subsequently known as the Southern Mani-
festo, the 1956 pledge of resistance to Brown v. Board of Education endorsed by almost
every member of the Southern contingent in both houses of Congress. See 102 CONG.
REC. 4515-16 (1956). Of the Southern senators, only Lyndon Johnson, Estes Kefauver,
and Albert Gore declined to sign. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 752 (1976).
298. Senator Eastland argued that "it would be a grave mistake if we proceeded with
haste to adopt new concepts unsupported by detailed factual surveys and studies," 111
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It may be that race really was not a major issue to a majority in Con-
gress. McCarran-Walter's supporters could not make political hay
out of it, moderates were unconcerned about the race of new immi-
grants, and liberals thought it was fair for previously excluded groups
to have a chance to enter in greater numbers. That is, perhaps Con-
gress as a whole truly meant to eliminate the race factor fromimmigration policy.
Statements of David Burke, then Senator Edward Kennedy's
Chief of Staff, suggests that this motive might have existed: "If you
can ever find some nobility in public policy, elimination of the Trian-
gle was one of [those] instances, I think, because it certainly wasn't
going to bring any acclamation to Ted Kennedy or his brother
Bobby." ' 9 "Scare" argumentation invoking a renewed threat of the
yellow peril would have been ineffective: "[I]n those days ... if the
guys from Alabama, or Mississippi, or Georgia, if that was the best
they could come up with, it was not a concern. The Asian immigra-
tion was not a concern. It was not a threat.... "'' According to
Congressman Peter Rodino, Jr., given the tenor of the times, no leg-
islator who wanted to avoid being tagged a racist would have insisted
on racial estimates?0 '
Senator Charles Mathias, who was in the House in 1965, said it
was fair to assume that the bill would have passed even had its effects
been known at the time. "After all, the bill was fairly dramatic in
abandoning the original quota system, and it was opening the gates
wider than they had been opened... ."30 In Robert Kastenmeier's
view, the bill would have passed even if its effects had been known at
the time: "I don't know that somebody around here would quibble
about whether it is one-half or one-third, or one-quarter, but I guess
most of us who supported the bill would have said, 'well, ... that's
not an unreasonable figure.' "303 Immigration Subcommittee member
Don Edwards also believes the bill would have passed even if its ef-
CONG. REc. 24,545 (1965), but his view did not prevail. Many commentators observe
that increasing racial toleration domestically was a factor in passing the bill. See, e.g.,
supra note 112 (listing sources discussing increased racial toleration). But why was this
important, if the 1965 Act was McCarran-Walter with a fresh coat of paint? A change in
racial attitudes signaled that a substantive, not merely formal, change in immigration
policy was possible.
299. Telephone Interview with David Burke, Former Chief of Staff to Senator Edward
M. Kennedy (June 29, 1995) (transcript on file with author).
300. Id.
301. See Telephone Interview with Peter Rodino, Jr., supra note 139.
302. Telephone Interview with Charles Mathias, supra note 144. Senator Mathias did
note that he was speculating. See id.
303. Telephone Interview with Robert Kastenmeier, supra note 141.
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fects had been known at the time. Arch Moore, Jr., also a member
of the House Judiciary Committee subcommittee responsible for
immigration, believes that awareness of the full consequences of the
bill with regard to Asian immigration "probably would have caused
some difficulty with the bill. Whether or not it would have been suf-
ficient to have defeated the bill, which had widespread administration
support, I doubt it."' Similarly, James Corman, then a member of
the House Judiciary Committee, "would have supported the bill"
even if its effects in increasing Asian immigration had been known."
President Ford's opinion that "[t]he existing laws were clearly out of
date with unrealistic quotas and racial bars" is also consistent with an
intent to create real change.3" Dale DeHaan explained that the race
of new immigrants was simply not a serious issue for most supporters
of the legislation, especially given the context of other civil rights
legislation which was being passed at the time."'
Participants from the administration echo these views. President
Johnson's counsel Myer Feldman agrees that arguments about
changes in the immigrant stream would have been unavailing:
"Certainly, the argument against 'more blacks,' 'more Asians,' or
'more Poles' was unpersuasive."' 9 "I have no reason to believe,"
Feldman says now, "that the commitment to ending discrimination
would have been less if its effects in increasing the percentage of
Asians had been perceived at the time of passage., 310 Katzenbach
also believes the bill would have passed even if its effects were known
at the time, 3 " as do Schlei? and Walinsky.313 While Thomas Ehrlich
does not know how others would have reacted to advance knowledge
of the bill's effects, it would not have made a difference to him or, he
believes, to State Department official Abba Schwartz. 4 If these
304. See Telephone Interview with Don Edwards, supra note 142.
305. Telephone Interview with Arch Moore, Jr., supra note 145; see also id. (making
similar comment).
306. Telephone Interview with James Corman, Former Member of Congress (Jan. 18,
1996) (transcript on file with author).
307. Letter from President Gerald R. Ford to Gabriel J. Chin, supra note 137, at 1.
308. See Letter from Gabriel J. Chin to Dale DeHaan, supra note 146, at 1.
309. Letter from Myer Feldman to Gabriel J. Chin, supra note 149, at 2.
310. Id. Referring to the absolute numbers of immigrants admitted, he explains that
"we did not anticipate the high level of immigration that followed the enactment of the
law. However, I doubt that if we had .... that [it] would have changed our policy." Id.
311. See Telephone Interview with Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, supra note 152.
312. See Telephone Interview with Norbert Schlei, supra note 157.
313. See Telephone Interview with Adam Walinsky, supra note 157.
314. See Telephone Interview with Thomas Ehrlich, supra note 159.
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views are representative, and if indeed some did not forecast a sig-
nificant increase in non-white immigration in 1965, perhaps the
reason was that the question was not decisive.
This is not to say that full disclosure of the racial consequences
would not have caused a ripple in Congress or the administration.
Some officials said that if the full consequences had been known that
would have given some supporters pause." However, not being en-
tirely free of anxiety is not inconsistent with real change. It would
not be surprising, for example, if even a sincere supporter of civil
rights legislation felt a twinge when confronting the concrete effects
of ending favoritism for whites. The reality that a white member of
Congress could lose his seat might make him look at the Voting
Rights Act from a different perspective.
G. The Assimilation Assumption
Members of Congress may have felt comfortable admitting a
greater proportion of non-whites because they assumed immigrants
would assimilate. Representative John Tunney, for example, assured
his colleagues that "[t]here is no hidden nefarious motive behind the
bill to undermine our American way of life." '316 Congress assumed
that immigrants wanted to come to the United States to share this
way of life."7 Representative Paul Findley explained: "[T]he Statue
of Liberty ... still stands as an inspiration and a hope to those mil-
lions beyond our borders who long for an opportunity to share in the
American heritage. To them, America is a promised land, a place of
refuge, a place where people can live in dignity and without fear.
31
Congress agreed with Presidents Kennedy31 9 and Johnson3 that
315. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Peter Rodino, Jr., supra note 139; Telephone
Interview with David Burke, supra note 299; Telephone Interview with Thomas Ehrlich,
supra note 159.
316. 111 CONG. REC. 21,791 (1965).
317. See, e.g., id. at 21,597 (remarks of Rep. Donald Irwin) ("IT]here is still room for
those in need of shelter and those in search of freedom."); id. at 21,787 (remarks of Rep.
Jeffery Cohelan) ("[Tloday we find countless thousands who look to this great melting
pot as a land of freedom and opportunity....").
318. Id. at 21,783.
319. In a letter to Congress, President Kennedy argued that his reforms would
provide a sound basis upon which we can build in developing an immigration law
that serves the national interest and reflects in every detail the principles of
equality and human dignity to which our nation subscribes.... [The national
origins quota system] should be modified so that those with the greatest ability
to add to the national welfare, no matter where they were born, are granted the
highest priority. The next priority should go to those who seek to be reunited
with their relatives.
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foreigners were allowed to immigrate to the extent that it was per-
ceived to be a benefit to America. Thus, Representative Feighan
insisted that "the interests of the United States were at all times first
and foremost" when Congress drafted and passed the bill?2' Ac-
cordingly, the law "carefully establishes conditions which guarantee
against any influx of refugees who might be openly or covertly hostile
to American principles."3
If America was looking out for itself, not the huddled masses,
why could it so blithely eliminate racial and national tests? The an-
swer was that individuals were nothing less than individuals, and
factors like race, religion, color or place of birth were irrelevant-
they said nothing about a particular person."' This focus on individu-
Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House on Revision of the
Immigration Laws, in PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN
F. KENNEDY 1963, at 594,595 (July 23, 1963).
320. See Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New York, in
2 PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON
1965, at 1037, 1038 (Oct. 3, 1965) (stating that "[t]hose who can contribute most to this
country-to its growth, to its strength, to its spirit-will be the first that are admitted to
this land"); Remarks to Representatives of Organizations Interested in Immigration and
the Problems of Refugees, in 1 PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1963-64, at 123, 123 (Jan. 13, 1964) ("What is the training
and qualification of the immigrant who seeks admission? What kind of citizen would he
make, if he were admitted?"); see also Annual Message to the Congress on the State of
the Union, in 1 PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B.
JOHNSON 1963-64, at 112, 116 (Jan. 8, 1964) ("[A] nation that was built by immigrants of
all lands can ask those who now seek admission: 'What can you do for our country?' But
we should not be asking: 'In what country were you born?' ").
321. 111 CONG. REC. 21,585 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Feighan). Senator Pastore also
noted:
John Kennedy's immortal test-Ask not what America can do for you-ask only
what you can do for America-would still be his test.... [I]t makes no differ-
ence what the race is, it makes no difference what the nationality is, it makes no
difference what the place of birth is. What counts is the contribution that a per-
son can make to this great America of ours.
Id at 24,562-63.
322. Id. at 21,770 (remarks of Rep. Jacob Gilbert).
323. President Johnson made this point in his signing message, saying that the national
origins quota system "violated the basic principle of American democracy-the principle
that values and rewards each man on the basis of his merit as a man." Remarks at the
Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New York, supra note 320, at 1038; see
also 111 CONG. REC. 21,594 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Peter Rodino) ("This long overdue
change recognizes the dignity of the individual and is predicated on the principle that one
person is no less desirable than any other person regardless of his race or place of birth.");
id. at 21,759 (remarks of Rep. Clark MacGregor) (noting that the "fundamental Ameri-
can attitude [is] to ask not where a person comes from, or to prejudge a person on the
basis of his place of birth, but to evaluate his personal qualities"). Representative Ber-
nard Grabowski stated that immigration should be:
based on the worth and integrity of each individual without regard to his country
or religion.... [Admission] will be based on what skills a person has to offer and
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ality was not just an acknowledgment of the idea that all people are
morally equivalent despite deep differences; it was also a claim that
they actually bear fundamental similarities.324 Representative Silvio
Conte noted the achievements of Italian Americans but then sug-
gested that this kind of background was irrelevant: "The single
overriding point is that aliens should and must be evaluated as indi-
viduals, not as incorrigible vassals of a racial, ethnic, or national
strain. They must be evaluated as future Americans, not as former
Italians, or Greeks, or Congolese, or Ethiopians, or anything else."''
"We have learned," said Edward Kennedy, "that there is no differ-
ence between people who participate in the life of our Nation. 326
Furthermore, Robert Kennedy explained that evaluating individuals
on "their merit.., is the whole philosophy of the immigration bill,
and that that was the whole philosophy of the civil rights bills of 1963
and 1964 and the voting rights bill of 1965.327
On the other hand, even if "in the United States we judge a man
by what he is and not by where his ancestors came from, what his re-
ligion is or what color his skin is,''32s we still judge him. As Edward
whether he already has close relatives in this country.... It is time that we start
to consider what an individual has to contribute, not whether those of his same
nationality are preponderate in this country.
Id at 21,764; see also id. at 21,771 (remarks of Rep. Jacob Gilbert) ("It is our birthright
that we are a nation of men, women and children, each an individual, and not a pawn of
society or the State. This measure is testimony of America's regard for the worth of the
individual."); id. at 21,778 (remarks of Rep. Paul Krebs) ("We must learn to judge each
individual by his own worth and by the value he can bring to our Nation."); id. (remarks
of Rep. Seymour Halpern) ("Americans are concerned with a man's merit and personal
integrity, and not with his ethnic background or racial stock."); id. at 21,784 (remarks of
Rep. Frank Annunzio) ("We have always measured a man's worth by his capacity to con-
tribute and not by his religious beliefs or nation of origin."); id. at 21,786 (remarks of Rep.
Henry Helstocki) ("[W]e are seeking an immigration policy which will reflect America's
ideal of equality of all men without regard to race, color, creed, or national origin ....").
324. See id. at 21,784 (remarks of Rep. Leonard Farbstein) ("Embodied in this bill is a
realization and a recognition which has become widespread in this Nation rather belat-
edly. Indeed, even now it is not yet accepted in all quarters. I am speaking of the
recognition of the basic equality of all men."); id. at 21,787 (remarks of Rep. Dominick
Daniels) ("The very basic contention that 'all men are created equal' is negated by our
immigration policy. A policy which flies in the face of our national ideals by holding that
some races and some ethnic groups make better Americans than others."); id. at 21,807
(remarks of Rep. Paul Fino) (noting "fundamental truth that all men, regardless of race,
color or religion, are created equal").
325. Id. at 21,818.
326. Id. at 24,777.
327. Id. at 24,778.
328. Id. at 21,787 (remarks of Rep. Dominick Daniels); see also Special Message to
Congress on Immigration, in 1 PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1965, at 37, 39 (Jan. 13, 1965) ("No move could more
effectively reaffirm our fundamental belief that a man is to be judged-and judged exclu-
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Kennedy put it, "[flavoritism based on nationality will disappear.
Favoritism based on individual worth and qualifications will take its
place." '9
One component of individual worth and qualification was that
the new immigrant assimilate and become a good citizen?' Repre-
sentative Moore explained:
In addition to the existing numerical quota limitations, in-
tending immigrants must satisfy strict moral, mental, health,
economic, and national security requirements. The law is
long and detailed on the specific criteria to be applied in
testing the qualifications of applicants. The objective of
these tests is obvious: To insure that those aliens admitted
are of good character, healthy, will not be a burden on our
economy, and will not endanger our form of government
and way of life?3 '
The United States could welcome new immigrants without fear of
damaging its special history and tradition, because the new immigra-
tion would assimilate to the United States just as had the old.332
But the form of assimilation suggested by the legislative history
was cosmopolitan and fluid; it did not demand that immigrants' his-
tory would be wiped clean as they arrived at LaGuardia Airport, or
sively--on his worth as a human being.").
329. 111 CONG. REc. 24,226 (1965); see also id. at 24,238 (remarks of Sen. Philip Hart)
(making similar point); id. at 24,564 (remarks of Sen. Thomas Dodd) (describing the pro-
visions of the bill).
330. See id. at 21,765 (remarks of Rep. Brock Adams). He stated:
I am very proud of the people who live in [my] District who have been patient
for many years in the face of America's inadequate immigration policies. They
number among our finest citizens, and a look at the people this bill will help the
most shows they are among the best people of our community. This is shown by
the warm affection they enjoy in the community and by such statistical factors as
the low school dropout rate, low crime rate, low incidence of welfare, and a high
degree of participation in all civic endeavors.
Id; see also id. at 21,796 (remarks of Rep. Roman Pucinski) ("We need good citizens,
good Americans from all the four corners of the world."); id. at 21,799 (remarks of Rep.
Edward Roybal) ("[W]e have always been an outward-looking people, coming as we do
from many ethnic and cultural backgrounds-a true melting pot of the strength and diver-
sity that has made America great.").
331. Id. at 21,780.
332. See, e.g., id. at 21,769 (remarks of Rep. John Lindsay) ("The law, obviously, must
be geared to this country's absorptive capacity."); id. at 21,779 (remarks of Rep. Seymour
Halpern) ("We are not a stagnant people, nor a nation stuck in its ways. Ours is a dy-
namic and ever-progressing society, always receptive to fresh insights and new ideas,
while at the same time, preserving those principles which have made our Nation great.");
id. at 21,783 (remarks of Rep. Lester Wolff) (arguing that the claim that many immigrants
would be "hard to assimilate ... [has] no foundation and crumble[s] when exposed to the
facts of immigration reform").
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that the United States would be denied the cultural contributions of
people from foreign lands. The words of Senator Saltonstall capture
both the respect for immigrant contributions to a dynamic and
evolving culture and the assumption of assimilation that the bill em-
bodied: "The homogeneity of American life has been enhanced by
the efforts of many groups of heterogeneous people."333
President Johnson7 and members of Congress asserted that newimmigrants would weave themselves into the fabric of a unitary
America without eradicating cultural distinctiveness. Representative
Rodino, for example, stated:
Surely one of the greatest sources of the strength of Amer-
ica is to be found in the diversity of the groups making up
our Nation. Each group has brought its traditions, its cul-
ture, its individual genius, and these in turn have become
part of the American heritage. Diversity marks the various
contributions to this heritage; unity has been the outgrowth
of a shared experience, of shared values. The American Na-
tion today stands as eloquent proof that there is no inherent
contradiction between unity and diversity.335
Senator Edward Kennedy also made clear that new immigrants
would assimilate:
Another fear is that immigrants from nations other than
those in northern Europe will not assimilate into our soci-
ety. The difficulty with this argument is that it comes 40
years too late. Hundreds of thousands of such immigrants
have come here in recent years, and their adjustment has
been notable.... The fact is, Mr. President, that the people
who comprise the new immigration-the type which this bill
would give preference to-are relatively well educated and
well to do.... They share our ideals. Our merchandise, our
styles, our patterns of living are an integral part of their own
countries. Many of them learn English as a second language
in their schools. In an age of global television and the uni-
versality of American culture, their assimilation, in a real
sense, begins before they come here.336
333. Id. at 24,441; see also id. at 24,501 (remarks of Sen. Joseph Tydings, citing an INS
official) ("Their gradual fusion with the multinational immigrants who came to this land
before and after them has helped to produce an amalgamated society which has no par-
ellel [sic] in the world.").
334. See Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New York,
supra note 320, at 1039 ("From a hundred different places or more they have poured forth
into an empty land, joining and blending in one mighty and irresistible tide.").
335. 111 CONG. REC. 21,594 (1965).
336. Id. at 24,228. Senator Kennedy continued:
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Emanuel Celler more than once told a story which palpably
communicates its message of pluralistic harmony:
If you go to my district [in Brooklyn, New York] you will
find people of all nationalities. And to give you an idea of
the pluralistic character of my district, which is symptomatic
[sic] of many, many districts in the Nation, I would like to
tell you a story.
A man goes into a Chinese restaurant, and there, to his
amazement, he sees a Negro waiter-a Negro waiter in a
Chinese restaurant. And he says to the waiter, "What is the
specialty of the house?" And the Negro waiter says, "Pizza
pie."
"Pizza pie in a Chinese restaurant?"
And he said, "Yes, this is the Yiddish neighborhood."
That gives you some idea of what is happening in this
country and what is happening is good for the land because
all those races are amalgamated and they are here for a
good, common purpose, the weal and the welfare of our Na-
tion, to which all these diverse races make contribution.337
In short, the law would not assume that a person could not be a
good American because of race, color or place of birth, but it did as-
sume that people would come here because they wanted to assimilate
into this society. Even a legislator who recognized that it might not
Let us erase forever today the stereotype of the immigrant in our history. The
cities of America no longer have the foreign neighborhoods, the cultural islands,
separate, unassimilated, a drag on the Nation. They are gone and policies based
on them should be gone.... The people who will be admitted under [the bill]
will continue to adjust to our country with the speed and dispatch of past immi-
grants.
IM. at 24,777.
337. Id. at 21,757. Representative Durward Hall, likewise, explained:
Mr. Chairman, from the "melting pot" which certainly we were, and had to be,
has come an American culture, a culture no less unique than that of any other
established nation in the world.... Persons from many nations and many na-
tionalities and many ethnic groups all contribute to this culture. But it is also
important to recognize that as they have changed America, so has America
changed them. The result is a nation which in combining the best of each ethnic
group has, in effect, like a great, fine hybrid, surpassed each predecessor, and
has provided a standard of living that surpasses that of any country from which
all our forebears once immigrated.
Id. at 21,775; see also id. at 24,467 (remarks of Sen. Hiram Fong) ("As a nation of immi-
grants, we have developed a racially heterogeneous society in which citizens of many
cultures and ethnic origins live and work side by side to make the American dream a re-
ality."); id. at 24,781 (remarks of Sen. Joseph Tydings) ("In his book, 'A Nation of
Immigrants,' President Kennedy reminded us that the three ships that discovered Amer-
ica flew the Spanish flag, sailed under an Italian captain, and included as members of their
crew an Irishman, a Negro, an Englishman, and a Jew.").
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be easy for white Americans to get used to unfamiliar languages and
colors could insist that anyone, in time, could become a part of "the
adventure and opportunity that America means," and share in the
"dream of America." 339
CONCLUSION
The 1965 Act is widely misunderstood. In conjunction with
other landmark civil rights bills of the time, it probably intended to
take race out of America's immigration policy. Although there is
sometimes good reason to question the true motives behind particu-
lar laws, the Congress of Camelot and the Great Society was perhaps
the most racially progressive America has ever seen. If these legisla-
tors were racial hypocrites, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 become very problematic-were they spuri-
ous, also?
Fortunately, the evidence in support of the argument that Con-
gress passed the 1965 Act only because it believed there would be
little change in the racial demographics of the immigrant stream is
limited. The evidence, in fact, actually shows the opposite. This
change is revolutionary, given how recently American interests in
winning World War II, the Korean War and Cold War were subordi-
nated to the more important policy of racial restrictions onimmigration. Knowing that non-whites would be likely to take ad-
vantage of the equalized opportunities, Congress passed the law
anyway. When Robert Kennedy announced that "[i]t will not matter
whether they come from Italy or Germany or whether they come
from some countries in the Far East," he seems to have been telling
the truth.
338. Id. at 24,562 (remarks of Sen. Pastore).
339. Id. at 21,783 (remarks of Rep. Philip Burton).
340. Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 421.
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